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Avalanche or Undue Alarm? An Empirical
Study of Subpoenas Received by the News
Media
RonNell Andersen Jones†
In 2006, Mark Fainaru-Wada, a reporter for the San Francisco Chronicle, sat down with his two young children to break
some bad news: he likely would be spending the holidays in
jail.1 He had refused to reveal the name of a confidential source
when subpoenaed to do so, and a federal district court judge
had found him in contempt and sentenced him to eighteen
months in federal prison.2 Journalists across the country were
outraged, but not wholly surprised.3 This, they said, was part of
an alarming trend—an “avalanche” of recent cases in which
members of the media had faced subpoenas seeking material
they did not believe they should be compelled to provide.
Across the country, a deputy attorney general was testifying in a congressional hearing.4 The avalanche, he said, was
† Associate Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham
Young University. This article was funded by a research grant from the University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law, where the author was a
Distinguished Faculty Fellow from 2004 to 2007. The author thanks University of Arizona Dean Toni Massaro and Associate Dean Kay Kavanagh for their
support of the project; the law faculties at the University of Arizona and Brigham Young University for helpful comments in work-in-progress presentations; Professors Kathie Barnes, Gordon Smith, and, especially, Lisa Grow
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1. Nick Cafardo, Only Integrity Is Revealed: Judge Plays Hardball but
Reporter Won’t Give, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 24, 2006, at C13.
2. See Bob Egelko, Silence Means Prison, Judge Tells Reporters, S.F.
CHRON., Sept. 22, 2006, at A1.
3. See Joe Garofoli, 2 Chronicle Reporters at Center of Media, Government Standoff, S.F. CHRON., Sept 20, 2006, at A1.
4. Reporters’ Privilege Legislation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2–8 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 Senate Judiciary Hear-
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imaginary—built of rhetoric and fear generated from a handful
of exceptionally high-profile cases in which reporters from large
national news media asserted a reporter’s privilege in response
to subpoenas and lost.5 In reality, reporters were being subpoenaed only rarely, in numbers and scope not warranting any major federal legislation.6
For more than thirty years, a legislative battle has raged
over the need for a federal shield law for journalists. But this
battle, which has turned largely on assertions about the frequency of media subpoenas, has been fought in the absence of
any useful data on the question. As hearings on Capitol Hill
continue to reverberate with proponents’ allegations of high
numbers of subpoenas and opponents’ allegations of low numbers of subpoenas, a neutral, empirical assessment of the number of subpoenas actually received by members of the mainstream press is completely missing from the dialogue. This
Article is designed to close that gap. It offers both an overview
of the modern debate on reporter’s privilege and a report on the
2007 Media Subpoena Survey, a nationwide survey of newspaper editors and television news directors conducted by this Article’s author. The survey aimed to assess the frequency and
impact7 of media subpoenas by tallying the self-reported numbers of subpoenas received during 2006 at daily newspapers
and network television news affiliates, and by comparing those
numbers to similar data collected before the recent spate of
high-profile cases.
The survey data reveal that, while the numbers of media
subpoenas may not constitute an avalanche in scale, they do
appear to justify federal legislation. Overall increases in subpoenas in the last five years are not as drastic as some media
organizations have contended, but the number, scope, and nature of subpoenas—particularly those in federal proceedings
and those related to confidential information—appear to be
significantly broader than opponents have claimed, suggesting
that the alarm is not entirely undue.

ings] (statement of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen. of the United States).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. The data on subpoena impact are presented in a separate article. See
RonNell Andersen Jones, Media Subpoenas: Impact and Perception in American Newsrooms (2008) (unpublished working paper, on file with the Minnesota
Law Review) [hereinafter Impact and Perception].
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Part I of the Article provides a historical context for the issue of reporter’s privilege and describes the dire need for an
empirical study on media subpoenas. Part II describes the
study that was designed to test the conventional wisdom about
the recent wave of high-profile cases and to contribute empirical data to the ongoing federal legislative debate. Part III sets
forth the results of the survey, divided into five major categories: (1) Subpoena-Frequency Data, describing the number and
distribution of subpoenas reported; (2) Federal-Subpoena Data,
focusing on the numbers that are most significant to the current congressional debate; (3) Confidential-Material Data, describing trends in data seeking source names or other information obtained under a promise of confidentiality; (4) Shield-Law
Data, comparing the experiences of those organizations protected by state shield laws and those that are not; and (5) Additional Data, including information about who is issuing subpoenas, what the subpoenas are seeking, and how the media
responds to them. Part IV summarizes the author’s conclusions.
I. THE NEED FOR THE STUDY: THE MODERN HISTORY
OF REPORTER’S PRIVILEGE AND FEDERAL SHIELD LAW
PROPOSALS
A. THE TREATMENT OF REPORTER’S PRIVILEGE BY COURTS
1. Branzburg v. Hayes
The modern story of reporter’s privilege begins with the
case of Branzburg v. Hayes,8 a 1972 Supreme Court decision in
which a deeply divided Court held that there was no privilege
under the First Amendment for journalists to refuse to testify
before a grand jury.9 The case launched one of the most remarkable legal developments in the history of media law, with
the creative attorneys of a then-popular press turning a losing
decision into a winning line of precedent that lasted for three
decades.
The named petitioner in the case was Paul Branzburg, a
reporter for the Louisville Courier-Journal, who wrote two stories about drug use and drug dealers in Kentucky and then received a subpoena to testify before a grand jury about his ob8. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
9. Id. at 667.
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servations.10 Branzburg’s case was consolidated with the cases
of two other reporters who in separate incidents had been subpoenaed to testify before grand juries about the activities of the
Black Panthers.11 The Supreme Court split 5-4, or, more accurately, 4-1-4,12 with Justice Lewis Powell providing the critical
fifth vote for the majority’s denial of the constitutional privilege.13 Powell did not join the plurality opinion authored by
Justice Byron White, which flatly rejected the argument that
the subpoenas implicated First Amendment concerns.14
The Branzburg dissenters would have recognized a qualified privilege rooted in the First Amendment.15 Justice Potter
Stewart, joined by Justices William Brennan and Thurgood
Marshall,16 argued that a journalist should be privileged from
revealing the identity of a confidential source unless the government is able to
(1) show that there is probable cause to believe that the newsman has
information that is clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of
the law; (2) demonstrate that the information sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less destructive of First Amendment
rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling and overriding interest in
the information.17

Justice Powell’s brief, tie-breaking, and legendarily
nebulous18 concurrence agreed that the petitioners were
10. Id. at 667–70.
11. Id. at 672–79 (describing In re Pappas, 402 U.S. 942 (1971), and United States v. Caldwell, 402 U.S. 942 (1971)).
12. Id. at 665.
13. Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
14. Justice White noted that the case did not explicitly involve a prior restraint, a limitation on what the press might publish, an order compelling the
press to publish something, or punishment for the publication of particular
content. See id. at 681 (majority opinion). Justice White also emphasized that
the press was not expressly “forbidden or restricted” from using confidential
sources and that, given the critical importance of grand jury subpoenas, the
demands of justice required that journalists be no more privileged than ordinary citizens. Id. at 681–82 (“The sole issue before us is the obligation of reporters to respond to grand jury subpoenas as other citizens do and to answer
questions relevant to an investigation into the commission of crime. Citizens
generally are not constitutionally immune from grand jury subpoenas; and
neither the First Amendment nor any other constitutional provisions protect
the average citizen from disclosing to a grand jury information that he has received in confidence.”).
15. See id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
16. Justice Douglas dissented separately, calling for an absolute, unqualified privilege. Id. at 711–12 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
18. Scholars and commentators have puzzled for years over the riddle of
Justice Powell’s seemingly confused effort to stake out a middle ground. See,
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unprotected by a constitutional privilege,19 but emphasized the
narrowness of the holding.20 He stressed that reporters
subpoenaed for purposes of harassment are differently
situated, and called for a balancing of the obligation of all
citizens to give relevant testimony with the constitutional
freedom of the press.21 “The Court does not hold that newsmen,
subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury, are without
constitutional rights with respect to the gathering of news or in
safeguarding their sources,” he wrote.22 “In short, the courts
will be available to newsmen under circumstances where
legitimate First Amendment interests require protection.”23
Seizing upon that language, media attorneys crafted an argument that legitimate First Amendment interests required a
privilege for journalists in a wide variety of cases, and that
Branzburg was limited only to its very facts: assertions of reporter’s privilege in the grand jury setting.24 For three decades
e.g., John D. Castiglione, A Structuralist Critique of the Journalist’s Privilege,
23 J.L. & POL. 115, 121 (2007) (calling Justice Powell’s opinion a “contrarian
concurrence”); James C. Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing
Qualified Privilege for Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709, 709 (2004) (“opaque”);
Monica Langley & Lee Levine, Branzburg Revisited: Confidential Sources and
First Amendment Values, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 13, 36 (1988) (“enigmatic”);
Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information:
Towards a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65
OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 278 n.90 (2004) (“ambiguous”); Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 95 n.191 (2005) (calling Branzburg a “notorious example” of the “bad practice” of “casting the essential fifth
vote for the ‘majority’ opinion while also writing a separate opinion qualifying
the Court’s opinion”). The Branzburg dissenters called the opinion “enigmatic,”
but noted that it “g[ave] some hope of a more flexible view in the future.”
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Recently discovered notes
on the case from Justice Powell’s papers indicate that the Justice did not, in
fact, believe that there should be a constitutionally protected reporter’s privilege based on the First Amendment, and that he envisioned something more
“analogous to an evidentiary [privilege].” Adam Liptak, A Justice’s Scribbles
on Journalists’ Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2007, § 4 (Week in Review), at 4.
19. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
20. Id.; see also Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 859–60 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring) (“[A] fair reading of the majority’s analysis in Branzburg makes plain that the result hinged on an assessment of the competing
societal interests involved in that case rather than on any determination that
First Amendment freedoms were not implicated.”).
21. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 709.
23. Id. at 710.
24. See Lucy A. Dalglish & Casey Murray, Déjà Vu All Over Again: How a
Generation of Gains in Federal Reporter’s Privilege Law Is Being Reversed, 29
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 13, 19 (2006) (“[F ]or thirty-two years, many subpoenaed reporters and their lawyers convinced courts all over the country that
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after Branzburg, a strong majority of state and federal courts
found some form of qualified First Amendment or common-law
privilege embodied in Justice Powell’s concurrence. Indeed,
within a decade,25 nearly every federal circuit had interpreted
that case to give rise to some form of qualified reporter’s privilege,26 and federal courts across the country had consistently
recognized the existence of a First Amendment-based privilege
in both civil and criminal cases.27 State courts followed suit in
finding a qualified privilege,28 either as a matter of common
law, or as a constitutional matter relying either on Powell’s
concurrence, or on the reporter-friendly standards of the applicable federal circuit. Some also recognized such a privilege
rooted in state constitutional law.29 The precise scope of the
Justice Powell’s concurrence represented the true majority view.”).
25. See John E. Osborn, The Reporter’s Confidentiality Privilege: Updating
the Empirical Evidence After a Decade of Subpoenas, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 57, 67 (1985) (“Many decisions in the wake of Branzburg have proven
more favorable toward the press, as lower courts strive to reconcile that decision’s holding with their own inclination to afford a measure of first amendment protection for the media. The result has been the development of a flexible ‘qualified’ privilege, where courts apply varying degrees of protection
depending on the factual context in which a dispute arises.”).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1504 (11th Cir.
1986); LaRouche v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir. 1986);
Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 710–11 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Bruno & Stillman, Inc.
v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 595–99 (1st Cir. 1980); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 1980); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 715 (3d Cir. 1979); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d
433, 438 (10th Cir. 1977); Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 467–68 (9th Cir.
1975); Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 779–80 (2d Cir. 1972); Cervantes v.
Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 992–93 (8th Cir. 1972). For an in-depth discussion of
circuit cases and their readings of Branzburg, see Kristina Spinneweber,
Branzburg, Who? The Existence of a Reporter’s Privilege in Federal Courts, 44
DUQ. L. REV. 317, 323–30 (2006) (“Branzburg has been effectively limited to
the grand jury setting.”).
27. Only the Sixth Circuit gave a bare reading to Justice White’s plurality
opinion. See Storer Commc’ns v. Giovan (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 810
F.2d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1987) (emphasizing that Justice White’s opinion in
Branzburg “declin[ed] to recognize the existence of a first amendment reporter’s ‘testimonial privilege that other citizens do not enjoy,’” and refusing to “resurrect” the privilege as a qualified one (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690)).
28. See, e.g., State v. Sandstrom, 581 P.2d 812, 814–15 (Kan. 1978) (applying Branzburg and opinions from various other state courts); State ex rel.
Classic III Inc. v. Ely, 954 S.W.2d 650, 653–60 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (relying on
various state and federal cases, including Branzburg); State v. St. Peter, 315
A.2d 254, 256 (Vt. 1974) (citing Branzburg); Brown v. Commonwealth, 204
S.E.2d 429, 431 (Va. 1974) (same).
29. See, e.g., In re Contempt of Wright, 700 P.2d 40, 45 (Idaho 1985);
Winegard v. Oxberger, 258 N.W.2d 847, 852 (Iowa 1977); Opinion of the Justices, 373 A.2d 644, 647 (N.H. 1977); Zelenka v. State, 266 N.W.2d 279, 286–87

2008]

NEWS MEDIA SUBPOENAS

591

privilege varies, but ordinarily calls for a balancing of interests,
taking into consideration such factors as the type of controversy
at issue; whether the information sought is critical for the prosecution or defense of the case; whether the information goes to
the heart of the matter; whether the information is relevant
and material; and whether the party seeking the information
from a member of the media has exhausted nonmedia alternative sources.30
2. McKevitt v. Pallasch
Notwithstanding the significant success that media attorneys had in invoking a qualified privilege after Branzburg, recent developments have reminded these attorneys that what
the courts give, the courts may take away. In 2003, one particularly prominent federal appellate judge authored an opinion
that was seen by many as marking the beginning of the end for
the court-created privilege.31
In McKevitt v. Pallasch,32 three Chicago newspaper reporters writing the biography of an informant who had infiltrated a
Northern Ireland terrorist organization challenged a court order to produce tape recordings of their interviews with the informant.33 The reporters, citing Branzburg, argued that they
were protected from compelled disclosure by a federal reporter’s
privilege rooted in the First Amendment.34
A three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit refused to stay the district court’s order
that the tapes be produced.35 Writing for the panel, Judge Richard Posner held that a subpoena for material not obtained
under a promise of confidentiality could not raise First
Amendment issues.36 Posner roundly criticized the journalist(Wis. 1978).
30. See, e.g., In re John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 574 N.E.2d 373,
375 (Mass. 1991); Ely, 954 S.W.2d at 655; Hopewell v. Midcontinent Broad.
Corp., 538 N.W.2d 780, 782 (S.D. 1995); State ex rel. Green Bay Newspaper
Co. v. Circuit Court, 335 N.W.2d 367, 372–74 (Wis. 1983).
31. See, e.g., Michael Miner, Reporter’s Privilege in Peril, CHI. READER,
Dec. 10, 2004, http://www.chicagoreader.com/hottype/2004/041210_1.html.
32. 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003).
33. Id. at 531.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 535.
36. Id. at 533 (“When the information in the reporter’s possession does not
come from a confidential source, it is difficult to see what possible bearing the
First Amendment could have on the question of compelled disclosure.”).
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friendly readings of Branzburg adopted by courts across the
country: “Some of the cases that recognize the privilege . . . essentially ignore Branzburg”; some “treat the ‘majority’ opinion
in Branzburg as actually just a plurality opinion”; and “some
audaciously declare that Branzburg actually created a reporter’s privilege.”37 Thus, Judge Posner blew a bold gust of wind at
the neatly constructed house of cards that media attorneys had
built out of Branzburg.38
Posner questioned why there needed to be “special criteria
[for a judge’s review of a subpoena] merely because the possessor of the documents or other evidence sought is a journalist.”39
Instead, he said, “rather than speaking of privilege, courts
should simply make sure that a subpoena duces tecum directed
to the media, like any other subpoena duces tecum, is reasonable in the circumstances, which is the general criterion for judicial review of subpoenas.”40 Branzburg itself had said so: reporters are just like everyone else.
McKevitt has yet to bring about a full-scale retreat by
courts from their recognition of a Branzburg-based qualified
privilege.41 However, as the first major opinion in three decades
37. Id. at 532.
38. Id. (“The approaches that these decisions take to the issue of privilege
can certainly be questioned.”). Judge Posner declared that cases citing Branzburg in recognizing a reporter’s privilege for confidential sources were surprising and that those recognizing a privilege for information not obtained under a
promise of confidentiality were “skating on thin ice.” Id. at 532–33.
39. Id. at 533.
40. Id.
41. As of September 2008, only two circuit courts and two district courts
outside of the Seventh Circuit have cited McKevitt. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Tatel, J., concurring) (distinguishing Branzburg by saying that McKevitt “involved a criminal
defendant’s effort to obtain nonconfidential records from the biographers of a
government witness, not waiver of confidentiality by a previously unidentified
source”); In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 45, 47 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting
that First Circuit cases “are in principle somewhat more protective” than
Judge Posner’s relevance and reasonableness requirements in McKevitt but
upholding a contempt order under the First Circuit precedent); Sioux Biochem., Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 785, 805 (N.D. Iowa 2005) (citing
McKevitt for a different point); N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d
457, 485, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (recognizing the existence of McKevitt, but noting that a privilege may still be found through “‘a case by case evaluation and
balancing of the legitimate competing interests of the newsman’s [privilege]’”
(quoting United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1983))), vacated and
remanded by N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160, 163, 169 (2d Cir. 2006)
(refusing to recognize whether there actually is a common law privilege without citing McKevitt because even if there is, it would be qualified, and the government’s need in this case is sufficient to overcome any such privilege). Even
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to seriously question the qualified-privilege progeny of Branzburg, it was not without impact. In part because Judge Posner
is seen as an “unusually influential judge,”42 and in part because his opinion in McKevitt came at a time in which journalists were losing previously widespread public support43 and in
the midst of several other high-profile privilege cases,44 commentators suggested that the opinion “changed the landscape”45 and that it served as a warning that the qualified,
court-created privilege the media had built for itself might be
short-lived.46
within the Seventh Circuit, McKevitt’s impact has not completely eliminated
protection for reporters. See, e.g., Hobley v. Burge, 223 F.R.D. 499, 504 (N.D.
Ill. 2004). In Hobley, the court noted that “McKevitt is the law in this Circuit,
which this court is bound to follow,” id. at 502, but went on to find some protection for reporters under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Judge
Posner’s reasonableness requirement in McKevitt. Id. at 504; see also United
States v. Hale, 32 Media L. Rep. 1606, 1608 (N.D. Ind. 2004) (citing McKevitt
and noting that “the mere fact that [the subpoenaed individual] is a reporter
does not automatically render the subpoena unreasonable”). Only one state
case, People v. Combest, 828 N.E.2d 583, 587 n.3 (N.Y. 2005), has cited McKevitt. Combest involved a criminal defendant’s attempt to obtain nonconfidential sources, and the court held that he had met his burden for disclosure. Id.
at 587. It cited McKevitt in a footnote string cite, noting that the Seventh Circuit does not “recognize the existence of any journalist’s privilege in the context of a criminal case.” Id. at 587 n.3.
42. Dalglish & Murray, supra note 24, at 37.
43. See Impact and Perception, supra note 7, 1–2.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 172–88; see also Dalglish & Murray, supra note 24, at 36 (suggesting that, with McKevitt, “the perfect storm
that devastated the federal reporter’s privilege started gathering”).
45. Wendy N. Davis, The Squeeze on the Press: More Courts Are Forcing
Reporters to Testify as Judges Reconsider Media Privilege, A.B.A. J., Mar.
2005, at 23.
46. See, e.g., Paul Brewer, The Fourth Estate and the Quest for a Double
Edged Shield: Why a Federal Reporters’ Shield Law Would Violate the First
Amendment, 36 U. MEM. L. REV. 1073, 1090 (2006); Dalglish & Murray, supra
note 24, at 37, 39 (arguing that McKevitt “drastically changed the formulations,” that “the media has lost much of the ground it gained since Branzburg,”
and that “[a]ny suggestion that a First Amendment argument has been developing over the past thirty years in the federal courts has been collapsing”);
Jane Kirtley, Will the Demise of the Reporter’s Privilege Mean the End of Investigative Reporting, and Should Judges Care if it Does?, 32 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 519, 520–21 (2006) (citing McKevitt as part of a trend of judges “question[ing] whether any kind of constitutional or federal common law privilege
exists” and “rejecting the suggestion that the public interest would actually be
enhanced by granting rights to the press not enjoyed by the public”); MaryRose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L.
REV. 515, 555 (2007) (citing McKevitt and noting that “[i]n the last few years,
the minority view that Powell’s concurring opinion is largely irrelevant has
been gaining ground”); Michael D. Saperstein, Jr., Federal Shield Law: Protecting Free Speech or Endangering the Nation?, 14 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
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B. FEDERAL SHIELD LAW PROPOSALS
1. Legislative Efforts in the Wake of Branzburg
The Branzburg majority explicitly noted that, while it was
declining to recognize a reporter’s privilege as a matter of constitutional doctrine, Congress remained free to craft such a privilege through federal legislation.47 And in the immediate wake
of Branzburg, members of Congress attempted to take the
Court up on its suggestion.48 Just one day after the Court
handed down its opinion in Branzburg, a bill was introduced in
the U.S. Senate calling for an absolute reporter’s privilege
against compulsory testimony in federal and state judicial proceedings.49 At least three other measures, all proposing a qualified privilege, followed on the heels of this one in the NinetySecond Congress.50 In just the first month of the Ninety-Third
Congress, fifty-six bills were introduced in the House, while
eight bills and one joint resolution were introduced in the Se-

543, 559 (2006) (noting that McKevitt “opened a floodgate of litigation in federal courts with a rising tide of holding journalists in contempt”); Leslie Siegel,
Note, Trampling on the Fourth Estate: The Need for a Federal Reporter Shield
Law Providing Absolute Protection Against Compelled Disclosure of News
Sources and Information, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 469, 473 (2006) (citing McKevitt for
the proposition that “the recent trend has been toward utilizing [Branzburg] to
refuse to recognize a reporter privilege”).
47. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972) (“At the federal level,
Congress has freedom to determine whether a statutory newsman’s privilege
is necessary and desirable and to fashion standards and rules as narrow or
broad as deemed necessary to deal with the evil discerned and, equally important, to refashion those rules as experience from time to time may dictate.”).
48. The post-Branzburg efforts were not the first attempts to shepherd a
federal shield law through Congress. As early as 1929, Kansas Senator Arthur
Capper introduced a bill that would have created a newsman’s privilege. See
71 CONG. REC. 5832 (1929); Sam J. Ervin, Jr., In Pursuit of a Press Privilege,
11 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 233, 241 n.23 (1974). Numerous other efforts arose between that time and the Branzburg case in 1972. See, e.g., S. 1311, 92d Cong.
(1971); S. 3552, 91st Cong. (1970); H.R. 16704, 91st Cong. (1970); H.R. 16328,
91st Cong. (1970); S. 1851, 88th Cong. (1963); H.R. 8519, 88th Cong. (1963);
H.R. 7787, 88th Cong. (1963); S. 965, 86th Cong. (1959); H.R. 355, 86th Cong.
(1959); STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., THE NEWSMAN’S
PRIVILEGE 62 (Comm. Print 1966); see also Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 689 n.28
(recognizing these proposed bills).
49. S. 3786, 92d Cong. (1972).
50. S. 3932, 92d Cong. (1972); S. 3925 Cong. (1972); H.R. 16527, 92d Cong.
(1972); see also Ervin, supra note 48, at 260–63 (describing the legislative flurry in the aftermath of Branzburg from the perspective of a senator who sponsored reporter’s privilege legislation).
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nate.51 All told, seventy-one bills were introduced in the year
immediately following Branzburg.52
In the extensive House and Senate hearings held between
1972 and 1975,53 the Department of Justice and representatives of media organizations were at odds over the appropriateness and necessity of a legislative reporter’s privilege.54 Supporters of a shield law contended that subpoenas against the
press had increased suddenly and dramatically,55 “assum[ing]
epidemic proportions”56 in a “calamitous change in the status
51. Ervin, supra note 48, at 261.
52. A Short History of Attempts to Pass a Federal Shield Law, NEWS MEDIA & L., Fall 2004, at 9 (“At least six bills [were] introduced quickly [after
Branzburg], and 65 would be introduced in the next year.”) [hereinafter A
Short History]; see also MAURICE VAN GERPEN, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
AND THE PRESS 148 (1979) (listing congressional sessions before 1975 in which
federal shield-law bills were introduced); Davis, supra note 45, at 22–23 (quoting the executive director of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press
as saying that ninety-nine bills were introduced between 1973 and 1978).
53. See generally Newsmen’s Privilege: Hearings on H.R. 215 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. (1975) [hereinafter 1975 House Hearings]; Newsmen’s Privilege: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong (1973) [hereinafter 1973
Senate Hearings]; Newsmen’s Privilege: Hearings on H.R. 717 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. (1973) [hereinafter
1973 House Hearings]; Freedom of the Press: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. (1972) [hereinafter 1972 Senate Hearings].
54. See, e.g., 1975 House Hearings, supra note 53, at 6 (statement of Rep.
Kastenmeier, Chairman, S. Comm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice) (noting that there is a “considerable difference of opinion
between the administration and the media . . . as to the need for a privilege”);
1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at 5 (statement of Sen. Ervin, Chairman,
S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“The Justice Department has argued that while it
does not oppose a qualified statutory privilege in principle, it is unnecessary in
view of . . . Justice Department guidelines.”).
55. See, e.g., 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at 282 (statement of
William F. Thomas, Editor, Los Angeles Times) (“We are in trouble right now,
deep trouble . . . . We have become a lawyer’s grab bag. . . . We are subpenaed
[sic] in every conceivable kind of case, and we never know where the assault is
going to come from.”); id. at 293 (statement of Richard C. Wald, President,
NBC News) (“[N]ever in my experience have the difficulties of following my
trade been as great as today.”); 1973 House Hearings, supra note 53, at 241
(testimony of A. M. Rosenthal, Managing Editor, New York Times) (“We fear
that wells of information are drying up, that we are not hearing all we should,
and that, therefore, the public is not hearing either.”); Ervin, supra note 48, at
243 (noting a “rather abrupt shift in . . . attitude”); id. at 246 (referencing “the
rash of subpoenas”); id. at 251 (quoting Senator Thomas H. McIntyre as reacting to “‘the recent wave of broad and sweeping subpoenas which have issued
from the Justice Department’”).
56. 1972 Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at 652 (statement of William M.
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quo.”57 Editors testified of a perceived seachange in attitude
among prosecutors and others issuing subpoenas, who long had
appreciated the special status of the press and declined to use
the media as an agent of discovery, but who now had few
qualms in seeking compelled evidence or testimony from reporters.58 Several shield law supporters suggested that initial,
highly publicized incidents of federal subpoenas “spread like
wildfire to courts throughout the land,” buoying other courts
and governmental agencies to use compulsory process against
the press.59
Supporters of federal legislation testified in droves of their
individual struggles with newsroom subpoenas, of perceived
leaps in overall numbers of subpoenas, and of large news organizations that had received more than one hundred subpoenas in a few years’ time.60 Law professor Vincent Blasi also testified, telling of a pre-Branzburg empirical study61 designed to
determine, among other things, how many respondents had
been served with subpoenas in conjunction with their reporting.62 But aside from Blasi’s testimony, the evidence presented
in legislative hearings was largely anecdotal, and the claims
were largely sweeping—that a “rash of subpoenas”63 was eroding respect for the press as an institution requiring unique protection from subpoenas.64
Ware, Chairman, Freedom of Information Comm. of the Associated Press
Managing Editors Association).
57. Ervin, supra note 48, at 243.
58. For example, Los Angeles Times Editor William Thomas stated:
[W]hat we are simply asking for is a return to where we were before
. . . . We always had an understanding, I think, with prosecutors,
there were certain things they couldn’t ask of us. They couldn’t bring
us into court, they couldn’t make us serve as an agent of the court,
[and] they couldn’t get hold of our material. When they made feeble
efforts to do so, that is all they were in those days, we told them they
were not going to do it and that was the end of it . . . .
1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at 291–92.
59. 1972 Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at 652 (statement of William M.
Ware, Chairman, Freedom of Information Comm. of the Associated Press
Managing Editors Association).
60. See Ervin, supra note 48, at 245.
61. 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at 136–44; 1973 House Hearings, supra note 53, at 127–41.
62. Vince Blasi, The Newsman’s Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH.
L. REV. 229, 260 (1971).
63. See, e.g., Ervin, supra note 48, at 246.
64. See 1972 Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at 653 (statement of William
M. Ware, Chairman, Freedom of Information Comm. of the Associated Press
Managing Editors Association).
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While the overwhelming weight of congressional hearing
testimony in the early- to mid-1970s supported some form of
legislative privilege,65 the lone dissenting views came from the
Justice Department, which adamantly opposed an absolute privilege66 and further argued against even a qualified legislative
privilege on a variety of grounds.67 Notably, the Justice Department consistently argued themes with empirical undercurrents: that the legislation was unnecessary because the number
of media subpoenas was in fact minimal, and that a free press
was adequately ensured through the Department’s Guidelines
on Media Subpoenas (the Guidelines).68
Promulgated by the Attorney General in 1970, just as the
cases that became Branzburg worked their way to the United
States Supreme Court,69 these Guidelines remain in force today. They have the stated aim of “provid[ing] protection for the
news media from forms of compulsory process, whether civil or
criminal, which might impair the news gathering function.”70

65. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 53, at 1 (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“With the sole exception of the
Department of Justice, witnesses at the hearings [before the House Judiciary
Committee in 1972], comprising Members of Congress and representatives of
organizations, and so forth, favored some form of privilege.”).
66. See 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at 331 (statement of Robert
G. Dixon, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States) (arguing that an absolute
privilege would “unduly subordinate the vital national interest in the fair and
effective administration of justice”); 1973 House Hearings, supra note 53, at 88
(testimony of Roger C. Cramton, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States)
(expressing opposition to an absolute privilege).
67. See 1975 House Hearings, supra note 53, at 7–8 (testimony of Antonin
Scalia, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States).
68. See, e.g., id. at 8 (testimony of Antonin Scalia, Assistant Att’y Gen. of
the United States) (“I question the benefits that are to be purchased at such
cost.”); 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at 334 (testimony of Roger C.
Cramton, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States) (“[I]t is doubtful whether
a statute providing a qualified privilege would have any additional effect, not
already accomplished by the guidelines, in insuring [sic] the free flow of confidential information to the press.”).
69. Justice White’s majority opinion in Branzburg referenced the recent
institution of the Guidelines, noting that the Attorney General first announced
the “Guidelines for Subpoenas to the News Media” in a speech given on August 10, 1970. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 n.41 (1972). After that,
the Guidelines were laid out in Department of Justice Memorandum No. 692,
which was dated September 2, 1970. Id. This memo was sent to all United
States Attorneys by the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal
Division. Id.
70. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2007).
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The Guidelines policy, applicable to “all members of the
Department in all cases,”71 dictates that the Attorney General
must expressly authorize any subpoena issued to the news media.72 It calls for a weighing of “the public’s interest in the free
dissemination of ideas and information and the public’s interest
in effective law enforcement and the fair administration of justice,”73 and requires that “[a]ll reasonable attempts should be
made to obtain information from alternative sources before
considering issuing a subpoena to a member of the news media.”74
Critics have argued that the Guidelines are wholly insufficient as a sole source of protection for journalists75 because they
create no right on the part of press members,76 are not enforced
by courts,77 do not carry any mandatory sanctions for the fail71. Id.
72. Id. § 50.10(e). The relevant provision states that if a member of the
news media expressly agrees to provide already published or broadcast material after negotiations with Department officials, the U.S. Attorney may authorize issuance of a subpoena. Id.
73. Id. § 50.10(a).
74. Id. § 50.10(b). Specifically, in criminal cases, the Guidelines indicate
that authorization will be granted if there are “reasonable grounds to believe,
based on information obtained from nonmedia sources, that a crime has occurred, and that the information sought is essential to a successful investigation—particularly with reference to directly establishing guilt or innocence.”
Id. § 50.10(f )(1). In civil cases, the policy calls for “reasonable grounds, based
on nonmedia sources, to believe that the information sought is essential to the
successful completion of the litigation in a case of substantial importance.” Id.
§ 50.10(f )(2). Except under “exigent circumstances,” the Guidelines provide
that the use of media subpoenas should be “limited to the verification of published information and to such surrounding circumstances as relate to the accuracy of the published information.” Id. § 50.10(f )(4). The Guidelines indicate
that media subpoenas “should not be used to obtain peripheral, nonessential,
or speculative information,” id. § 50.10(f )(1), and that “[e]ven subpoena authorization requests for publicly disclosed information should be treated with care
to avoid claims of harassment.” Id. § 50.10(f )(5). The policy calls for negotiations with the media in all cases in which a media subpoena is contemplated.
Id. § 50.10(c).
75. See Dalglish & Murray, supra note 24, at 35 (“Away from the public
eye in Washington, the guidelines remained guidelines, and would have little
to no effect if the attorneys issuing the subpoenas did not want to follow them.
. . . [W]hile the higher office of the Attorney General maintains that the guidelines are vitally important, the United States Attorneys have the ability to ignore the guidelines as they deem necessary.”).
76. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(n) (stating that the regulations “are not intended
to create or recognize any legally enforceable right in any person”).
77. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964,
975–76 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“The guidelines . . . exist to guide the Department’s
exercise of its discretion in determining whether and when to seek the is-
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ure to apply them,78 and are subject to potentially radical differences in enforcement with changing personnel or changing
philosophies of administrations.79 Nevertheless, at least at the
time of their initial promulgation, the policies were welcomed
as a potential mechanism for staving off the tide of press subpoenas.80
In their testimony in opposition to federal shield law proposals immediately post-Branzburg, Justice Department representatives insisted that the Guidelines should serve as the
primary mechanism of press protection, arguing against any
codification of the Guideline principles and questioning the
need for federal legislation.81 Assistant attorneys general told
members of Congress “that at present the guidelines are working satisfactorily and nothing more is needed on the Federal

suance of subpoenas to reporters, not to confer substantive or procedural benefits upon individual media personnel.”); In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850, 854 (4th
Cir. 1992) (holding that the Guidelines were “of the kind to be enforced internally by a governmental department, and not by courts”).
78. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(n) (“Failure to obtain the prior approval of the
Attorney General [before subpoenaing a reporter] may constitute grounds for
an administrative reprimand or other appropriate disciplinary action.”). The
policy does not set forth penalties for violations other than the entire failure to
obtain approval. For example, it does not call for disciplinary action for the
failure to negotiate with the media prior to issuing the subpoena or for a failure to make reasonable attempts to obtain the information elsewhere; nor does
it call for any check on the attorney general’s grant of approval. See id.
79. See, e.g., 1973 House Hearings, supra note 53, at 99 (statement of Rep.
Cohen, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“There has been some discussion
and concern about the Attorney General’s regulations, about the changing
personnel and possible changing philosophy of those assuming the position.”).
80. See, e.g., Ervin, supra note 48, at 252–53 (reporting a perceived “sudden reduction in the number of federal government subpoenas which followed
the issuance of the guidelines”). The plurality opinion in Branzburg called the
Guidelines “a major step in the direction [that members of the media] . . . desire to move” and suggested that they “may prove wholly sufficient to resolve
the bulk of disagreements and controversies between press and federal officials.” Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972).
81. See 1975 House Hearings, supra note 53, at 13 (testimony of Antonin
Scalia, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States) (arguing that “experience
under these guidelines demonstrates that there is no need for statutory proscription at the Federal level”); 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at 332
(statement of Robert G. Dixon, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States)
(“[T]he successful experience under the Attorney General’s ‘Guidelines for
Subpoenas to the News Media’ . . . demonstrates that legislation governing
Federal proceedings is unnecessary at this time.”); 1973 House Hearings, supra note 53, at 88 (testimony of Roger C. Cramton, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the
United States) (arguing that federal legislation establishing a testimonial privilege for newsmen is unnecessary).
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level,”82 and that the President would “reconsider his position
on the need for Federal legislation should it ever become apparent that the Federal guidelines fail to maintain a proper
balance between the newsman’s privileges and his responsibilities of citizenship.”83 Arguing that the evidence demonstrated
there were “no abuses on the part of Federal prosecutors at the
present time,”84 the testimony suggested that members of the
media were overreacting,85 and that the threat of subpoenas
was having no real impact on the operations of the press.86 The
Justice Department’s position was that the executive could be
trusted to abide by the Guidelines and to “pledg[e] [itself] to an
atmosphere of negotiation and restraint.”87 Echoing testimony
that had been given by other Justice Department representatives at hearings on similar legislation proposed in the previous
three years, then-Assistant Attorney General Antonin Scalia
told the House Judiciary Committee in 1975 that he could
“think of no field in which it is safer to provide a degree of administrative discretion than this field dealing with the special
treatment to be accorded to the press.”88 Scalia emphasized
that he did not think the free flow of information could “best be
achieved by any form of rigid legislative proscription.”89 In82. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 53, at 98 (testimony of Roger C.
Cramton, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States).
83. Id. at 88 (citations omitted); see also 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note
53, at 334 (statement of Robert G. Dixon, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United
States) (setting forth the administration’s position that “[s]uch legislation
should be adopted . . . only after the necessity for it becomes apparent”).
84. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 53, at 98 (testimony of Roger C.
Cramton, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States); see also 1973 Senate
Hearings, supra note 53, at 332 (statement of Robert G. Dixon, Assistant Att’y
Gen. of the United States) (“To the best of our knowledge, no abuses have occurred regarding subpenas [sic] authorized under the guidelines.”).
85. See 1973 House Hearings, supra note 53, at 94 (testimony of Roger C.
Cramton, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States) (“I think there is a tendency of any institution to be predominantly interested in its own problems. I
would point out that the press, of all interest groups in our society, is in the
best position to protect itself.”).
86. See id. at 97 (“It seems to me that lots of confidential and private material is turning up in the newspapers every day. I don’t see that the existing
tension and uncertainty about what the law is is harming a vigorous and robust press.”).
87. See 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at 336 (statement of Robert
G. Dixon, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States).
88. 1975 House Hearings, supra note 53, at 22 (testimony of Antonin Scalia, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States).
89. Id. at 12; see also id. at 14 (calling for reliance on the “wise exercise of
administrative discretion” with legislative inquiries, as necessary).
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stead, he said, “the only satisfactory protection is a constant
advertence to the particular sensitivity of this area by law enforcement agencies themselves. At the Federal level, this has
been assured by the Justice Department guidelines.”90
The Justice Department presented numerical data to support its arguments. In sharp contrast to testimony by media
representatives referencing great increases in subpoenas, the
Department argued that as an empirical matter, the problem of
media subpoenas was not arising with any frequency.91 In both
legislative hearing testimony and submitted reports, the Justice Department took the position “that requests for subpoenas
to newsmen occur only infrequently under the Guidelines,”92
and stressed what it called the “very small portion of the total
news in the newspapers that can ever give rise to the question
of compulsory process to a newsman”93 and the “small number
of situations in which newsmen have been compelled to testify.”94 The Justice Department also produced a report describing
the Department’s activity under its Guidelines between August
1970 and March 1973, indicating that subpoenas had been requested “in only thirteen situations and eleven of these situations involved newsmen who, though willing to testify or produce documents, preferred to follow the formal procedure for
the issuance of a subpoena.”95
The Department recited these same numbers and presented the same memorandum two years later as evidence of
the lack of need for the legislation, downplaying an admittedly
stark increase in numbers in the two years since the memorandum had been produced.96 Scalia insisted, as those before him
90. Id. at 12.
91. See 1973 House Hearings, supra note 53, at 578–83 (Memorandum
from Roger C. Cramton, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States, the Dep’t of
Justice (Oct. 4, 1972)).
92. Id. at 578 (Letter from Roger C. Cramton, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the
United States, to Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Oct. 5, 1972)).
93. Id. at 95.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 579; see also 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at 332
(statement of Robert G. Dixon, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States) (citing the same statistics).
96. See 1975 House Hearings supra, note 53, at 13, 15. When asked by a
legislator for updated numbers, Assistant Attorney General Scalia indicated
that there had been forty-six subpoenas issued under the guidelines in the
two-year period since March 1973. Id. at 13. Pressed for details on this apparent tripling of the subpoena numbers, he said the matters were “still being

602

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[93:585

had, “that experience under these guidelines demonstrates that
there is no need for statutory proscription at the Federal level.”97
2. Subsequent Legislative Efforts
Ultimately, none of the bills in the surge just after Branzburg ever went to a floor vote in either house of Congress. It
appears that only one bill was voted out of committee.98 The
legislative fervor of the Branzburg aftershocks diminished, in
no small part because of the reading given to Branzburg by
lower courts—many of whom, within a few years of the Supreme Court’s decision, had held that the opinion supported a
qualified privilege for journalists in some circumstances.99 In
spite of the decreased sense of urgency on the issue, the remainder of the 1970s and the 1980s saw several federal legislative privilege proposals that, like their predecessors, never
made it to the floor.100
For a time, legislative efforts had their detractors within
the media itself.101 Many believed that anything less than an
absolute privilege—especially in the case of confidential
checked upon” and that he “d[id] not know all [he] would like to know about
them.” Id.
97. Id.
98. H.R. 215, 94th Cong. (1975); see VAN GERPEN, supra note 52, at 169–
70.
99. See supra Part I.A.1; see also 1975 House Hearings, supra note 53, at
95 (testimony of Jack Nelson, Member, Executive Comm. for Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press) (“[T]he Branzburg case has not proved to be the
disaster that some feared.”); Ervin, supra note 48, at 274 (noting a “declining
sense of urgency” and suggesting that “the willingness of the courts to limit
the Supreme Court decision under certain circumstances, plus the apparent
change of heart by prosecutors, served to muffle the hue and cry in Congress”).
100. See, e.g., H.R. 368, 96th Cong. (1979); H.R. 14309, 95th Cong. (1978);
H.R. 562, 94th Cong. (1975); H.R. 172, 94th Cong. (1975); H.R. 15242, 93d
Cong. (1974); H.R. 14981, 93d Cong. (1974); see also A Short History, supra
note 52, at 9 (describing a failed federal shield law proposed by the American
Bar Association in 1974, an unsuccessful lobbying effort by the International
Executive Board of the Newspaper Guild in 1977, three pieces of legislation
introduced in the House of Representatives in 1978 and 1979, a bill introduced
by Representative Crane in January 1981, and a 1987 movement in which
Senator Reid “circulate[d] [a] draft of [a] federal shield law to media groups for
comments”).
101. See 1973 House Hearings, supra note 53, at 358 (statement of Clark R.
Mollenhoff, Washington Bureau Chief, Des Moines Register) (“Any government role . . . has the major drawback of permitting government to have ‘a little control’ over the press.”); Vermont Royster, Op-Ed., Dubious Shield, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 28, 1973, at 10, reprinted in 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 53,
at 642–44 (expressing doubts as to the remedy proposed).
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sources—would put the press at too great a risk,102 and they
fought earnestly against others within the industry who welcomed at least a qualified privilege.103 Some worried that inviting governmental regulation would be a tacit recognition of the
government’s right to regulate the press in other ways, or that
permitting the government to define “the press” for purposes of
the privilege104 could lead to further governmental control or
licensing of the press.105 Reporter Lewis H. Lapham colorfully
compared media efforts to lobby Congress for a shield law to
“convicts building gallows from which they will hang.”106 These
conflicting fears made lobbying efforts “a disorganized mess.”107
But by 2004, in response to the beginnings of a string of
high-profile cases in which a reporter’s privilege was unsuccessfully asserted108 and to signals that courts might retreat from
interpretations of Branzburg that were favorable to the
press,109 the issue of a federal reporter’s privilege was moved to
the front burner again, and even some who had spoken against
federal legislation warmed to the idea.110
102. See 1973 House Hearings, supra note 53, at 536 (statement of Elmer
W. Lower, President, ABC News) (arguing for an absolute privilege); id. at 538
(statement of Robert G. Fichenberg, Chairman, Freedom of Information Committee, American Society of Newspaper Editors) (“[A] qualified shield law will
not provide the protection that is needed.”).
103. See Dalglish & Murray, supra note 24, at 18–19.
104. Stephen Bates, The Reporter’s Privilege, Then and Now, 38 SOC’Y 41,
50 (2001) (“Defining a journalist is dicier.”).
105. See Bree Nordenson, The Shield Bearer, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.,
May/June 2007, at 48, 50 (quoting Floyd Abrams, First Amendment Att’y,
stating that asking legislatures for help is “‘dangerous ideologically and practically . . . . Ideologically because we shouldn’t be asking them for favors and
practically because God knows what they’ll do.’”); see also Jane Kirtley, Investigation or Illusion? The Secretive Probe into the Leak of Valerie Plame’s Name
Has Done Little More Than Threaten the Rights of the Press, AM. JOURNALISM
REV., Dec. 2004/Jan. 2005, at 66.
106. VAN GERPEN, supra note 52, at 167 (quoting Lewis H. Lapham, The
Temptation of a Sacred Cow, HARPER’S, Aug. 1973, at 43).
107. Dalglish & Murray, supra note 24, at 19; see also id. at 18 (“None [of
the early proposals] passed—largely because ‘the media’ could not decide what
it wanted.”).
108. See infra Part I.C.
109. See supra Part I.A.2; see also infra Part I.C.
110. See, e.g., Douglas McCollam, Attack at the Source: Why the Plame Case
Is So Scary, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Mar./Apr. 2005, at 29, 36 (“[Those in
the media industry] say the media are united as never before in seeking to get
a shield law through Congress.”); Nordenson, supra note 105, at 48, 50 (“[T]he
media’s consensus on the need for legislative action is new.”); Tony Pederson,
Warming Up to the Idea of a Federal Shield Law, NEWS MEDIA & L., Winter
2005, at 8.
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In November 2004, Senator Christopher Dodd introduced
the Free Speech Protection Act of 2004,111 a bill that would
have provided reporters with an absolute privilege against disclosing sources, whether or not the sources had been promised
confidentiality.112 The bill also would have conferred a qualified
privilege upon reporters when they were subpoenaed for notes,
documents, photographs, and other information obtained in the
course of newsgathering.113 The quest for legislation had begun
again in earnest, and what followed was a flurry of legislative
proposals not seen since Branzburg’s immediate aftermath. In
the 109th Congress alone, five bills were proposed in the
House114 and the Senate.115
For the first time in three decades, Washington buzzed
with talk of a possible legislative privilege for journalists. None
of the proposals between 2004 and 2006 made it out of committee, but they generated an intense amount of heated dialogue
in hearings on Capitol Hill.116 In 2007, the momentum for the
law built, and in October 2007, proponents of a federal shield
claimed their greatest victory to date when the House of Representatives passed the Free Flow of Information Act of 2007,
111. S. 3020, 108th Cong. (2004).
112. Id. § 4(b).
113. Id. § 4(a). Senator Dodd introduced the legislation in the closing hours
of the 108th Congress and reintroduced the bill in the 109th Congress. S. 369,
109th Cong. (2005) (referred to the Committee on the Judiciary).
114. Representative Pence proposed the Free Flow of Information Act, H.R.
581, 109th Cong. (2005), in the House in February 2005. It was reintroduced
in July as H.R. 3323, 109th Cong. (2005). The bill called for a near-absolute
privilege for confidential information and a qualified privilege for nonconfidential information. For a comparison of the coverage of the different bills, see
Anthony L. Fargo, Analyzing Federal Shield Law Proposals: What Congress
Can Learn from the States, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 35, 50–55 (2006).
115. In the Senate, in addition to Senator Dodd’s reintroduced measure,
Senator Lugar introduced the Free Flow of Information Act, S. 340, 109th
Cong. (2005), in February 2005, which was substantively identical to H.R. 581,
109th Cong. (2005). That bill was reintroduced in July 2005 as S. 1419, 109th
Cong. (2005), which was identical to H.R. 3323, 109th Cong. (2005). The following year, Lugar introduced yet another Free Flow of Information Act. S.
2831, 109th Cong. (2006). For an in-depth review of the Free Flow of Information Act of 2006, see generally Mark Gomsak, Note, The Free Flow of Information Act 2006: Settling the Journalists’ Privilege Debate, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 597,
606–22 (2007).
116. See, e.g., 2006 Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 4; Hearing on
Reporters’ Privilege Legislation Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
(Oct. 19, 2005) (on file with the Minnesota Law Review) [hereinafter October
2005 Hearing]; Hearing on Reporters’ Shield Legislation Before S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (July 20, 2005) (on file with the Minnesota Law Review) [hereinafter July 2005 Hearing].
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H.R. 2102, by a vote of 398-21.117 Sponsored by Representative
Mike Pence and Representative Frederick Boucher, the Act applied to those who engaged in journalism “for a substantial portion of the person’s livelihood or for substantial financial
gain.”118 The bill’s overall approach was two-tiered, giving
broader protection to confidential sources than to general information.119
Twelve days before H.R. 2102 passed the House, a narrower bill, covering only material obtained by a reporter under a
promise of confidentiality,120 cleared the Senate Judiciary
Committee by a vote of 15-2.121 In July 2008, Senate sponsors
offered a modified version of that bill on the Senate floor as a
substitute amendment.122 In response to harsh criticism from
the Attorney General, the new bill was even narrower than the
original Senate version, making it easier for the government to
force disclosures in cases of leaked classified information and
beefing up the instances in which reporters would be required
to make disclosures to prevent criminal activities.123 But a vote
on the modified bill was blocked and the Senate had not yet be-

117. H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. (2007). H.R. 2102 was identical to S. 1267,
110th Cong. (2007), as introduced on May 2, 2007 by Senator Lugar.
118. H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. § 4(2) (2007).
119. Compare id. § 2(a)(2) (setting up a qualified privilege with a balancing
test for criminal and civil investigations), with id. § 2(a)(3) (establishing more
limited exceptions to an otherwise absolute privilege against disclosure of a
confidential source only when revealing the source is: (A) “necessary to prevent, or to identify any perpetrator of, an act of terrorism . . . or other significant and specified harm to national security”; (B) “necessary to prevent imminent death or significant bodily harm with the objective to prevent such death
or harm, respectively”; (C) “necessary to identify a person who has disclosed (i)
a trade secret . . . (ii) individually identifiable health information . . . or (iii)
nonpublic personal information”).
120. S. 2035, 110th Cong. § 7 (2007). Sponsored by Senators Specter and
Schumer, S. 2035 also had a series of enumerated exceptions that made its
application narrower than the House version. Id. A different bill, S. 1267,
110th Cong. (2007), which was identical to H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. (2007), as
proposed by Representatives Pence and Boucher, was introduced by Senators
Lugar and Dodd at the same time that Pence and Boucher introduced H.R.
2102, but it did not receive Judiciary Committee consideration. Senators Lugar and Dodd opted to co-sponsor S. 2035.
121. See 154 CONG. REC. S7595 (daily ed. July 29, 2008) (statement of Sen.
Leahy); Letter from Sen. Leahy to Sens. Reid and McConnell (Mar. 6, 2008),
available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200803/030608e.html.
122. See 154 CONG. REC. S7595 (daily ed. July 29, 2008) (statement of Sen.
Leahy).
123. Walter Pincus, Vote on Journalist Shield Stalled, WASH. POST, July
31, 2008, at A17.
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gun debate on it when this Article went to press.124 Moreover,
in the wake of the shield law’s passage in the House, the Bush
administration issued a press release indicating that the president’s advisors would counsel him to veto the bill if presented
to him.125 Thus, shield-law proponents’ most promising year in
history appeared likely to end with no federal law on the books.
Throughout these modern debates, supporters and
opponents sparred over the appropriate scope of shield
coverage,126 over the need to address national security
concerns127 and limit the courts’ application of the shield to
address such issues,128 and over the best definition of “reporter”
in an age when bloggers generate Internet news.129 Yet woven
124. Id.
125. Statement of Admin. Policy, Executive Office of the President (Oct. 16,
2007), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/110-1/hr2102sap-h.pdf.
The statement argued that the shield law “would create a dramatic shift in the
law that would produce immediate harm to national security and law enforcement[,] . . . mak[ing] it extremely difficult to prosecute cases involving
leaks of classified information and would hamper efforts to investigate and
prosecute other serious crimes.” Id.
126. See, e.g., July 2005 Hearing, supra note 116 (statement of Rep. Pence,
Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (noting the evolution of his proposed bill
from an absolute privilege for confidential sources to a qualified privilege); id.
(testimony of Geoffrey Stone, Professor, University of Chicago School of Law)
(arguing that a “qualified privilege undermines the very purpose of the journalist-source privilege”); see also 2006 Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note
4, at 19 (statement of Victor Schwartz, Partner, Shook, Hardy & Bacon, LLP)
(noting that evidence scholars agree that “privileges in the private context”
should not be absolute).
127. 2006 Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 4, at 1–2 (statement of
Sen. Specter, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (noting the hearing was
designed to address concerns that a shield law would “hamper” the activities
of the Department of Justice in “national security cases or in criminal prosecutions”); see also id. at 3 (statement of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen. of
the United States) (“Security and freedom are not mutually exclusive or, as
Justice Goldberg famously observed, the Constitution ‘is not a suicide pact.’”).
128. Compare id. at 6 (statement of Sen. Specter, Chairman, S. Comm. on
the Judiciary) (suggesting that courts possess “the capacity to weigh national
security matters”), with id. (statement of Sen. Kyl, Member, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary) (noting that the national security exception provides no clear guidance for the courts to apply).
129. See, e.g., July 2005 Hearing, supra note 116 (statement of Sen. Leahy,
Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (noting that prior efforts to enact a shield
law “failed, in part because supporters of the concept found it difficult to agree
on how to define the scope of what it meant to be a ‘journalist’” and that “with
bloggers participating fully in the 24-hour news cycle,” a similar problem exists today); see also 2006 Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 4, at 111
(statement of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen. of the United States) (noting
the possible constitutional dilemma of defining “journalist” only in terms of
people who work for financial gain because it “discriminates against individu-
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throughout the discussions was the same core question that
had anchored the Executive’s opposition to a federal shield law
three decades earlier: was the law necessary at all? Journalists
testifying at legislative hearings about the changing legal tide
and the high-profile losses they were experiencing in federal
courts were countered by Justice Department representatives
echoing reservations made a generation earlier about the
usefulness of a federal shield.130 With each taking a page from
their 1970s playbooks, representatives of the media cited “[a]n
unusually large number of subpoenas seeking the names of
anonymous sources [that had been] issued in a remarkably
short period of time to a variety of media organizations and the
journalists they employ.”131 Meanwhile, the administration
dubbed the legislation “a solution in search of a problem.”132
The result was another massive disconnect between the
numerical story told by the media and the empirical narrative
put forth by the government.
On the one hand, in pounding home their recurring theme,
Department of Justice representatives testified in positive
terms about the use of the Guidelines and in dismissive terms
about the numbers of federal subpoenas being issued to members of the media, insisting that Department regulations “ha[d]
served to limit the number of subpoenas authorized for source
information to little more than a handful over its 33-year history,”133 and that the problem was rare.134 At an October 2005
Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, U.S. Attorney Chuck Rosenberg asked, “What is broken about the way we are handling
matters involving subpoenas to the media? We rarely issue
subpoenas to the media seeking information about confidential
als who, for no money, contribute a story to a local newspaper”).
130. Compare July 2005 Hearing, supra note 116 (testimony of Norman
Pearlstine, Editor-in-Chief, Time, Inc.) (citing a “disturbing trend”), with 2006
Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 4, at 113 (statement of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen. of the United States) (“[O]nly rarely has the Department
determined that the interests of justice warranted seeking to compel a journalist to reveal information obtained from a confidential source.”).
131. July 2005 Hearing, supra note 116 (testimony of Lee Levine, Partner,
Levine Sullivan Koch & Schulz, LLP).
132. 2006 Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 4, at 107 (statement of
Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen. of the United States).
133. October 2005 Hearing, supra note 116 (testimony of Chuck Rosenberg,
United States Att’y).
134. See id. (“For the last 33 years, the Department of Justice has authorized subpoenas to the news media only in a small number of cases involving
serious allegations of criminal conduct.”).
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sources. And when we do, it is only after painstakingly careful
review and meticulous adherence to our internal guidelines.”135
On the other hand, in tones reminiscent of their immediately post-Branzburg legislative battles, federal shield law
supporters in the 2005 hearings noted a “recent surge in the
number of subpoenas” and an “increase in the severity of contempt penalties.”136 Media advocates commented on the stark
contrast between the good judicial treatment given to the press
in the years following Branzburg and the high-profile contempt
citations in very recent cases.137 They also referenced a “profound departure from the [prior] practice of federal prosecutors.”138 As a numerical matter, some journalists who testified
spoke in generic terms of “several” problematic cases,139 or of
getting “a number of subpoenas . . . all the time,”140 or of being
subpoenaed “several times a month.”141 Veteran media attorney
Floyd Abrams testified that “[i]n the last year and a half, more
than 70 journalists and news organizations have been embroiled in disputes with federal prosecutors and other litigants
seeking to discover unpublished information; dozens have been
asked to reveal their confidential sources; some are or were virtually at the entrance to jail.”142 Several testifying journalists
referred to “more than two dozen reporters” who had been subpoenaed or questioned about their confidential sources in fed135. Id.
136. July 2005 Hearing, supra note 116 (testimony of Lee Levine, Partner,
Levine Sullivan Koch & Schulz, LLP); see also id. (testimony of Matthew
Cooper, White House Correspondent, Time Magazine) (referencing “a run of
federal subpoenas of journalists”).
137. See id. (testimony of Lee Levine, Partner, Levine Sullivan Koch &
Schulz, LLP) (“There appear to have been only two decisions from 1976–2000
arising from subpoenas issued by federal grand juries or prosecutors to journalists seeking confidential sources. Both involved alleged leaks to the media
and in both, the subpoenas were quashed. Yet in the last four years, three federal courts of appeals have affirmed contempt citations issued to reporters
who declined to reveal confidential sources, each imposing prison sentences
more severe than any previously known to have been experienced by journalists in American history.”).
138. Id. (testimony of Norman Pearlstine, Editor-in-Chief, Time, Inc.).
139. October 2005 Hearing, supra note 116 (testimony of David Westin,
President, ABC News) (citing “several, high-profile cases over the last two
years”).
140. Id.
141. Id. (testimony of Anne Gordon, Managing Editor, Philadelphia Inquirer).
142. July 2005 Hearing, supra note 116 (testimony of Floyd Abrams, Partner, Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP).
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eral court cases, either in the “last year”143 or “in the past two
years.”144 Legislative sponsors echoed these numerical assertions.145 The government, meanwhile, asserted that the Justice
Department issued only a dozen subpoenas in such cases in the
fourteen years since 1991.146
The disparity in the numerical assessments partially stems
from a difference in the universe of subpoenas being described
by each side of the debate. The Justice Department focused
narrowly on confidential-source materials in the prosecutorial
setting. For example, when Rosenberg testified that the Department’s Criminal Division had issued only twelve subpoenas
for confidential source materials since 1991,147 his statement
may have been responding to journalists’ claims about apples
with an assertion about oranges. The number of subpoenas Rosenberg cited did not include, for example, subpoenas from spe143. October 2005 Hearing, supra note 116 (testimony of Anne Gordon,
Managing Editor, Philadelphia Inquirer); see also July 2005 Hearing, supra
note 116 (testimony of Lee Levine, Partner, Levine Sullivan Koch & Schulz,
LLP) (“Indeed, three federal proceedings in Washington, D.C. alone have generated subpoenas seeking confidential sources to roughly two dozen reporters
and news organizations, seven of whom have been held in contempt in less
than a year.”); id. (testimony of William Safire, Political Columnist, New York
Times) (“More than ever, journalists across the nation are now in danger of
being held in contempt, nearly two dozen in Federal courts alone.”).
144. October 2005 Hearing, supra note 116 (testimony of Judith Miller, Reporter, New York Times) (“More than two dozen reporters have now been subpoenaed in the past two years and are in danger of going to jail.”); see also July
2005 Hearing, supra note 116 (testimony of Norman Pearlstine, Editor-inChief, Time, Inc.) (“In the last two years, dozens of reporters have been subpoenaed to reveal their confidential sources, many of whom face the prospect
of imminent imprisonment.”).
145. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. S4803 (daily ed. May 18, 2006) (statement of
Sen. Dodd) (“In the past year alone, some two dozen reporters have been subpoenaed or questioned about their confidential sources.”); see also July 2005
Hearing, supra note 116 (statement of Sen. Lugar, Member, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary) (“Over two dozen reporters were served or threatened with jail sentences last year in at least four different Federal jurisdictions for refusing to
reveal confidential sources.”); id. (testimony of Rep. Pence, Member, H. Comm.
on the Judiciary) (“In the past year, nine journalists have been given or
threatened with jail sentences for refusing to reveal confidential sources and
at least a dozen more have been questioned or on the receiving end of subpoenas.”); id. (statement of Sen. Dodd, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary)
(“Some two dozen other journalists stand subpoenaed or prosecuted in our
country at this hour.”).
146. October 2005 Hearing, supra note 116 (testimony of Chuck Rosenberg,
United States Att’y) (“Over the last 14 years, . . . we have issued subpoenas to
the media seeking confidential sources 12 times.”).
147. See id. (“And that’s why if you look at the past 14 years, we’ve only
issued 12 confidential source subpoenas.”).
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cial prosecutors, who had been the sources of the highestprofile media subpoenas in recent history, arising out of the Valerie Plame investigation and other cases.148 Indeed, in the
wake of the October Senate Judiciary Committee hearing,
journalist organizations decried the Justice Department testimony as misleading and dishonest, noting that it conflicted
with the Department’s own 2001 report, which indicated that it
had authorized eighty-eight subpoenas of news media since
1991, seventeen of which sought information that could identify
a source or source material.149 But without any clear, current
empirical data of its own, the media could only speak in general
terms and cite high-profile examples.
In the two legislative sessions that followed, the mathematical back-and-forth continued.150 Journalists testifying in
148. See infra text accompanying notes 174–88.
149. Casey Murray, Sparring over a Shield, NEWS MEDIA & L., Fall 2005,
at 14. In early September 2001, Senator Grassley, ranking member of the
Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs, wrote two letters to the Department of
Justice, asking if Department of Justice procedures had been followed in the
case of Associated Press reporter John Solomon, whose home telephone
records had been subpoenaed, and requesting specific details about those procedures. See Letter from Sen. Grassley, to Larry Thompson, Deputy Att’y
Gen., Department of Justice (Dec. 6, 2001), http://www.rcfp.org/news/
documents/grassley.pdf (referencing letters written on September 4 and 6,
2001). Senator Grassley also requested specific information regarding how
many times in the past ten years media organizations or journalists had been
subpoenaed by the Department of Justice and how many of those subpoenas
were issued in an attempt to get information on a journalist’s source. Id. The
response letter from Assistant Attorney General Daniel J. Bryant, indicated
that between 1991 and September of 2001 there were at least eighty-eight instances in which subpoenas were authorized in connection with members of
the news media. See Letter from Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Att’y Gen., Department of Justice, to Sen. Grassley (Nov. 28, 2001), http://www.rcfp.org/
news/documents/grassley.pdf. Of those eighty-eight subpoenas, seventeen had
been issued seeking the name of a reporter’s source or information that could
lead to the identification of a source. Id. The letter indicated that these numbers had been compiled from information obtained from the Department’s
Criminal Division and did not include information from other divisions. Id.
This total also did not include authorizations for grand jury subpoenas to
members of the news media. Id. Senator Grassley responded to this information in a December 6, 2001 letter expressing his doubts over “how much caution the Department of Justice exercises when seeking information from, or
about, members of the media.” Letter from Sen. Grassley, to Larry Thompson,
Deputy Att’y Gen., Department of Justice, supra.
150. In proposing his 2006 bill, Senator Lugar contended that “[o]ver 30
reporters were recently served or threatened with jail sentences in at least
four different Federal jurisdictions for refusing to reveal confidential sources.”
152 CONG. REC. S4800 (daily ed. May 18, 2006) (statement of Sen. Lugar). In a
September 2006 Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, Senator Leahy asserted
that “[i]n the last year, half a dozen journalists have been jailed or fined for
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support of the most recent legislation spoke anecdotally about
their own contempt penalties151 and the chilling effect that
high-profile cases had on other reporters and their sources.152
While arguing that “[i]ncreasingly, subpoenas to journalists
have become a weapon of first resort for those seeking information concerning confidential sources,”153 that “this deluge of
subpoenas in the Federal courts has now reached epidemic proportions,”154 and that “the process of gathering of the news has
been under unprecedented attack,”155 supporters nevertheless

protecting their sources.” 2006 Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 4, at 95
(statement of Sen. Leahy, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary). The Deputy
Attorney General testifying on behalf of the Justice Department countered
with a different set of numbers, saying that “[i]n the past 15 years, the [Attorney General] has approved only approximately 13 requests for media subpoenas that implicated source information.” Id. at 105 (statement of Paul J.
McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen. of the United States). In proposing the 2007 legislation, Senator Lugar noted that over thirty reporters “have recently been
served subpoenas or questioned . . . about their confidential sources.” 153
CONG. REC. S5504 (daily ed. May 2, 2007) (statement of Sen. Lugar). Another
supporter gave the ballpark figure of “more than seventy” federal subpoenas
seeking unpublished information in the “last several years.” Free Flow of Information Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 2102 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 105–06 (2007) (Letter from Denise A. Cardman, Acting Director, American Bar Association, to Rep. Conyers, Chairman, H. Comm. on
Judiciary (June 13, 2007)) [hereinafter 2007 House Judiciary Hearings].
151. See, e.g., 2007 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 150, at 64 (testimony of Jim Taricani, Investigative Reporter, WJAR/NBC10 News) (“I am just
one of several reporters in recent years that have been sent to prison or
threatened with subpoenas for refusing to disclose a confidential source.”).
152. Id. at 74 (“I have talked to people who are very aware of all the ongoing highly publicized cases of reporters being found in contempt or being sent
to jail and some of these people who could provide information are not. They
are very leery about what might happen, what they might get tangled up
with.”); see also id. at 69 (testimony of William Safire, Chairman, Dana Foundation) (“The Justice Department can say, ‘Gee, there are very few cases.’ We
have just seen an example of somebody incarcerated at home and although
these are individual cases, we live with individual cases and these cases, I
think, militate toward dealing with this terrible trend . . . .”).
153. Id. at 101 (statement of the National Association of Broadcasters).
154. Id. at 32 (testimony of Lee Levine, Partner, Levine Sullivan Koch &
Schulz, LLP).
155. Id. at 29 (testimony of William Safire, Chairman, Dana Foundation);
see also id. at 32 (testimony of Lee Levine, Partner, Levine Sullivan Koch &
Schulz, LLP) (“For almost three decades following [Branzburg], subpoenas issued by Federal courts seeking disclosure [of ] journalists’ confidential sources
were very, very rare. . . . That situation has now changed. An unprecedented
number of subpoenas seeking the names of confidential sources have been issued by Federal courts in a remarkably short period of time.”).
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acknowledged that there was no clear empirical data to tell the
entire story.156
The Justice Department countered that “the case has [not]
been made that any legislation is necessary on this subject,”157
and flatly denied that “subpoenas to the media are on the
rise.”158 Reemphasizing the role of the Department Guidelines,
Assistant Attorney General Rachel Brand testified that the Department had a “record of restraint” when it came to subpoenaing the press.159 She suggested that a few isolated highprofile cases involving major media organizations were causing
unnecessary panic among journalists outside the Beltway.160
“When one gets past the overheated rhetoric,” she said, “there
is simply no evidence that the Department is now pursuing
subpoenas of the press more aggressively or in greater numbers
than it has in the past.”161 She reported that “[e]vidence gathered by the Department’s Criminal Division reflect [sic] that
the Attorney General has approved subpoenas to the media
seeking source-related information in only 19 cases since 1991.
Only four of those cases have occurred since 2001.”162 When
questioned about trends outside the confines of federal criminal
prosecutions, Brand testified that she did not have that information, but that she was confident there had been no surge as
to the Department.163 Representative Pence noted that Brand
was describing only a very limited universe of subpoenas.164
156. Id. at 75 (testimony of Lee Levine, Partner, Levine Sullivan Koch &
Schulz, LLP) (“I hesitate to quote an exact number [of subpoenas compelling
reporters to reveal their confidential sources], because it is very hard to get
data on this.”).
157. Id. at 18 (testimony of Rachel Brand, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 24.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 18; see also id. at 21 (“The fact is that the Department issues
subpoenas to the media very rarely.”).
163. Id. at 84 (“So whether courts are appointing special prosecutors who
are issuing more subpoenas or whether private litigants are issuing more subpoenas, that I can’t answer because I don’t have that information in hand. But
I can tell you that with respect to source-related subpoenas, in particular,
there have only been those subpoenas in four matters since 2001. And since
1991, when the Department started keeping that information, it has happened
in 19 cases. So I don’t view that as a surge, at least with respect to [the] Department of Justice.”).
164. Cf. id. at 88 (statement of Rep. Pence, Member, H. Comm. on Judiciary).
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Brand acknowledged that the nineteen cases mentioned were
only those involving subpoenas for source-related information,
and that dozens more subpoenas may have been issued in other
contexts.165 This, Pence said, highlighted the “numbers game”
played throughout the debates:166 “[T]here clearly is a dispute
over whether this is a solution in search of a problem or whether this is an avalanche.”167
Certainly, when a core question in a legislative debate is
the frequency with which the relevant factual scenario arises,
proponents of the legislation might be expected to amplify evidence of that frequency and opponents might be expected to
downplay it. But the radical empirical disparities in the shield
law debate are only partially explained by definitional differences and bias. Indeed, in the thirty years since Branzburg v.
Hayes, there has not been a single neutral academic study empirically assessing the frequency and impact of subpoenas
against the press.168 While dozens of commentators and scholars have written in support of a federal shield law,169 and have
165. See id. (testimony of Rachel Brand, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United
States).
166. Id. (statement of Rep. Pence, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
167. Id.; see also id. at 92 (voicing concern about the discrepancy between
the numbers asserted by the Department of Justice and those asserted by
supporters of the legislation).
168. Blasi’s study immediately before Branzburg was the last known major
academic effort of this kind. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.
John Osborn conducted a similar empirical study in 1985 while he was interning at the Reporter’s Committee for Freedom of the Press. See Osborn, supra
note 25, at 57.
169. See, e.g., Leslye deRoos Rood & Ann K. Grossman, The Case for a Federal Journalist’s Testimonial Shield Statute, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 779,
802 (1991) (proposing a model reporter’s shield statute that would give absolute privilege to members of the institutional media); Jennifer Elrod, Protecting Journalists from Compelled Disclosure: A Proposal for a Federal Statute, 7
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 115, 126 (2003) (offering a model statute “as a
remedy for the multiple problems that exist in the current patchwork of state
and federal rules and rulings regarding forced disclosure”); Fargo, supra note
114 (examining proposed bills in comparison to state shield laws and offering
drafting suggestions to avoid legal challenges); Michael A. Giudicessi, A Federal Shield Law for Journalists: A Matter of Good Housekeeping, 23 COMM.
LAW., Summer 2005, at 15 (arguing that a federal shield law is necessary as a
matter of fairness because employees of executive branch agencies are sheltered under the federal housekeeping statute); Richard B. Kielbowicz, The
Role of News Leaks in Governance and the Law of Journalists’ Confidentiality,
1795–2005, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 425, 487–94 (2006) (proposing that Congress
adopt shield legislation that considers the role of leaks and that protects anonymity where political communication is advanced); William E. Lee, The
Priestly Class: Reflections on a Journalist’s Privilege, 23 CARDOZO ARTS &
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insightfully debated the appropriate contours of potential federal legislation,170 the significant empirical question has not
been answered.171 Thus, with no shortage of ideas on what
ENT. L.J. 635, 643, 683–84 (2006) (explaining that legislatures are free to exempt journalists from generally applicable laws and arguing for a congressionally created privilege); Geoffrey R. Stone, Why We Need a Federal Reporter’s
Privilege, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 39, 39–41 (2005) (claiming that the journalistsource privilege is just as important as currently recognized privileges); Leila
Wombacher Knox, Note, The Reporter’s Privilege: The Necessity of a Federal
Shield Law Thirty Years After Branzburg, 28 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
125, 144 (2005) (arguing that leaving the issue to conservative courts is unwise and urging passage of a pending bill); Jaime M. Porter, Note, Not Just
“Every Man”: Revisiting the Journalist’s Privilege Against Compelled Disclosure of Confidential Sources, 82 IND. L.J. 549, 562–63, 568–71 (2007) (arguing
that a privilege is increasingly necessary and that a federal shield law is the
superior means for strengthening it); Siegel, supra note 46, at 469 (proposing a
model statute granting an absolute privilege and arguing the need for such
legislation in light of recent court decisions and variances in protection among
the states); Leita Walker, Comment, Saving the Shield with Silkwood: A Compromise to Protect Journalists, Their Sources, and the Public, 53 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1215, 1237–47 (2005) (proposing a statute that adopts a balancing test
from caselaw).
170. See, e.g., Laurence B. Alexander, Looking Out for the Watchdogs: A
Legislative Proposal Limiting Newsgathering Privilege to Journalists in the
Greatest Need of Protection for Sources and Information, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 97, 101 (2002) (arguing that the definition of journalist could become too
broad, which would undermine an attempt to protect true journalists); Elrod,
supra note 169, at 147–49; Fargo, supra note 114, at 49–73; Papandrea, supra
note 46, at 565.
171. Some scholars, while not gathering the numerical data to demonstrate
the frequency of subpoenas, have noted the difficult task of quantifying the
impact of subpoenas on investigative reporting and the use of confidential
sources. See, e.g., Randall D. Eliason, Leakers, Bloggers, and Fourth Estate
Inmates: The Misguided Pursuit of a Reporter’s Privilege, 24 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 385, 417–18 (2006) (explaining the common assumption that if reporters are compelled to reveal their sources, the confidential flow of information will dry up and arguing that this assumption is “impossible to prove empirically”). Others presuppose empirical information or adopt one side or the
other’s data. See, e.g., Dalglish & Murray, supra note 24, at 42 (“a dramatic
spike in federal subpoenas”); Eliason, supra at 417 (“The truth remains that,
despite a few recent high-profile cases and the protestations of large and wellfunded media organizations, cases in which a reporter is compelled to testify
and reveal confidential sources are still extremely rare.”); Steven D. Zansberg,
The Empirical Case: Proving the Need for the Privilege, MEDIA L. RESOURCE
CENTER BULL., Aug. 2004, at 145, 148, available at http://www.medialaw
.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Publications1/MLRC_Bulletin/Bulletin_Archive/
2004-2WhitePaper.pdf (arguing that since Branzburg, there has been a “growing body of evidence—testimonial, empirical, and anecdotal—that persuasively demonstrates the vital role that confidential sources . . . plays [sic] in the
daily generation of important news reports on topics of public interest and
concern” and that “this evidence points to the conclusion that without constitutional protection afforded to reporters and other newsgatherers against
compelled disclosure of their sources . . . the American people would inevitably
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should be done about the allegedly increasing numbers of subpoenas against the media, the numbers themselves remain
missing.
C. RECENT HIGH-PROFILE CASES AND THE CONVENTIONAL
WISDOM ABOUT THEIR EFFECT
The need for an impartial survey of media subpoena numbers has become all the more pressing in recent years. Without
question, the very recent history of reporter’s privilege has been
turbulent, at best. In the five-year period between 2002 and
2007, journalists in the United States faced an unprecedented
wave of exceptionally high-profile cases in which subpoenaed
reporters asserted a privilege, lost their arguments, and then
either relented and testified or were jailed for contempt.
Although, prior to the present study, the jury was still out
on whether this wave represented or triggered an increase in
the number of subpoenas, it is indisputable that during that
time period there was a substantial increase in publicity about
the issue of reporter’s privilege. Beginning in approximately
2002, a firestorm of headlines emerged as reporters’ battles—
and ultimate losses—were placed in the public spotlight in a
way that had not been seen for at least three decades.
First, a federal district court judge took the thenextraordinary step172 of holding journalist James Taricani, a
broadcast reporter for WJAR Channel 10 in Providence, Rhode
Island, in criminal contempt and sentencing him to six months
of home confinement, after a $1000-per-day civil fine failed to
persuade Taricani to comply with a subpoena requiring him to

be deprived of the information necessary to be self-governing citizens”); Sean
W. Kelly, Note, Black and White and Read All Over: Press Protection After
Branzburg, 57 DUKE L.J. 199, 224–25 (2007) (noting the “growing trend” of
federal prosecutors issuing subpoenas for journalists to reveal sources); Jeffrey
S. Nestler, Comment, The Underprivileged Profession: The Case for Supreme
Court Recognition of the Journalist’s Privilege, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 201, 243
(2005) (discussing the “increasing number of journalists being held in contempt”); Walker, supra note 169, at 1219 (referring to “the recent onslaught of
subpoenas”); see also Papandrea, supra note 46, at 539 n.143 (citing Blasi’s
study as one attempt to generate empirical evidence).
172. See, e.g., Pam Belluck, Reporter Is Found Guilty for Refusal to Name
Source, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2004, at A24 (noting that the Taricani’s case was
“unusual because he faced the jail time not to force him to reveal his source,
but as punishment for refusing to do so”); Jane Kirtley, Not So Privileged, AM.
JOURNALISM REV., Feb./Mar. 2005, at 62 (describing as “rare” the punishment
of reporters who defy court orders by refusing to reveal confidential sources).
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reveal the name of the source from whom he had received a videotape showing a government official accepting a bribe.173
Then, in a Federal Privacy Act174 suit brought against the
federal government by Taiwanese-born nuclear physicist Dr.
Wen Ho Lee,175 a district court held six reporters from national
news outlets in contempt for failing to reveal confidential
sources who had leaked personal details about Dr. Lee and his
alleged involvement in espionage for China.176 After the D.C.
Circuit refused to overturn the contempt citations—and despite
the fact that they were not named defendants in the suit—the
New York Times, the Associated Press, ABC News, the Los Angeles Times, and the Washington Post agreed to a controversial
collective settlement of $750,000 with Dr. Lee in an effort to
protect the confidentiality of the sources and to save their reporters from possible jail time.177
A third case arose out of the Bay Area Laboratory CoOperative’s (BALCO) alleged distribution of illegal steroids to
well-known, high-profile athletes. Fainaru-Wada and his fellow
San Francisco Chronicle reporter Lance Williams—who won
major journalism awards for exposing the steroids scandal178—
were subpoenaed to reveal the source of grand jury transcripts
discussed in their articles.179 When they refused, a federal court
held them in civil contempt and ordered them confined “until
such time as [they were] willing to give such testimony or pro173. See In re Special Proceedings, No. 01-47 (D.R.I. Dec. 9, 2004), available at http://www.rid.uscourts.gov/opinions/torres/12092004_1-01MSC0047T_
Sentencing.pdf (sentencing Taricani to six months home confinement); In re
Special Proceedings, 291 F. Supp. 2d 44 (D.R.I. 2003), aff ’d, 373 F.3d 37 (1st
Cir. 2004) (ordering Taricani to reveal his source). Ultimately, the source revealed himself. See Katie Zezima, Lawyer Says He Gave Convicted Reporter
Videotape in Corruption Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2004, at A26.
174. Federal Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000).
175. Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 287 F. Supp. 2d 15 (D.D.C. 2003), aff ’d in part
and vacated in part, 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
176. Neely Tucker, Wen Ho Lee Reporters Held in Contempt, WASH. POST,
Aug. 19, 2004, at A2.
177. Paul Farhi, U.S., Media Settle with Wen Ho Lee: News Organizations
Pay to Keep Sources Secret, WASH. POST, June 3, 2006, at A1. The settlement
also involved an $895,000 payment by the government. Id. It was entered into
after the reporters petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari,
which ultimately was denied. See Thomas v. Lee, 547 U.S. 1187 (2006).
178. See BALCO Reporters Win National Recognition: 2 Will Receive Prize
at Washington Dinner, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 10, 2005, at A2; Prize for Chronicle’s
BALCO Investigation: Steroids Probe Wins National Award from Sports Editors, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 20, 2005, at A2.
179. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, Fainaru-Wada and Williams, 438 F.
Supp. 2d 1111, 1113–14 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
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vide such information.”180 The reporters were spared imprisonment only by their source’s decision to reveal himself.181
In another Privacy Act case, Dr. Steven Hatfill, a proclaimed germ weapons expert identified by the FBI as a “person
of interest” in the anthrax-laced mailings that shook the country just weeks after the September 11 attacks,182 subpoenaed
six reporters to identify a government source who he said had
leaked personal information about him to the press.183 Toni Locy, formerly of USA Today, was issued a contempt sanction—
and, in an “unprecedented step,”184 the court ordered her to pay
fines of up to $45,500 herself, with no assistance from USA Today.185 At publication, the case is still pending.
Perhaps most notoriously, New York Times reporter Judith
Miller spent eighty-five days in jail in 2005 for refusing to reveal the “senior [Bush] administration officials” who had outed
covert CIA agent Valerie Plame to her and to other reporters
from national news organizations.186 Miller was sentenced to
confinement until she agreed to testify.187 She ultimately
agreed to do so, saying it was because she had obtained a release from her confidentiality promise with her source, and because the special prosecutor agreed to limit his questioning “‘so
that it would not implicate other sources of hers.’”188
180. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, Fainaru-Wada and Williams, No. CR
06–90225 JSW, 2006 WL 2734275, at *2−3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2006).
181. See Bob Egelko, Lawyer Admits Leaking BALCO Testimony: He Agrees
to Plead Guilty; Prosecutors Say They’ll Drop Bid to Jail Chronicle Reporters,
S.F. CHRON., Feb. 15, 2007, at A1.
182. See Hatfill v. Ashcroft, 404 F. Supp. 2d 104, 106–08 (D.D.C. 2005). The
Justice Department ultimately settled the suit with Hatfill for $4.6 million.
Scott Shane & Eric Lichtblau, Scientist Is Paid Millions by U.S. in Anthrax
Suit, N. Y. TIMES, June 28, 2008, at A13.
183. See Hatfill v. Gonzales, No. M8–85, 2007 WL 2710116, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 11, 2007) (referencing Brian Ross of ABC); Hatfill v. Gonzales, 505 F.
Supp. 2d 33, 35–36 (D.D.C. 2007) (referencing Michael Isikoff and Daniel
Klaidman of Newsweek, Allan Lengel of the Washington Post, Toni Locy, formerly of USA Today, and James Stewart, formerly of CBS News).
184. Ken Paulson, Op-Ed., The Real Cost of Fining a Reporter, USA TODAY,
Mar. 12, 2008, at 11A.
185. See id.
186. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 966 (2005)
(quoting Robert Novak, The Mission to Niger, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 14, 2003,
at 31); see In re Special Counsel Investigation, 338 F. Supp. 2d 16, 17 (D.D.C.
2004).
187. Adam Liptak, Reporter Jailed After Refusing to Name Source, N.Y.
TIMES, July 7, 2005, at A1.
188. David Johnston & Douglas Jehl, Times Reporter Free from Jail; She
Will Testify, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005, at A1 (quoting Bill Keller, Executive
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Statements of media advocates that are peppered throughout the coverage of these cases,189 coupled with the strong assertions of reporters’ advocacy groups in the aforementioned
legislative debates,190 strongly suggest that journalists now believe that this string of cases adversely affected their legal climate.191 Journalists believe that prosecutors and civil litigants
now feel much more comfortable subpoenaing the press,192 and
the conventional wisdom holds that attorneys who would not
have subpoenaed the press five years ago now view a media
subpoena as both more socially acceptable and more likely to be
legally permissible.193
Editor, New York Times). Her source was I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, Vice President Cheney’s former chief of staff, who ultimately was found guilty of four
felony counts. Neil A. Lewis, Libby, Ex-Cheney Aide, Guilty of Lying in C.I.A.
Leak Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2007, at A1.
189. See, e.g., Zachary Coile, Key Lawmakers Urge Justice Department to
Rescind Subpoenas of BALCO Reporters, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 19, 2007, at A1
(“The Chronicle case has become Exhibit A for lawmakers pushing for a federal shield law . . . .”); Charles Lane, Deal with Wen Ho Lee May Make PressFreedom Case Moot, WASH. POST, May 23, 2006, at A3 (calling the Lee case
“one of the most significant press-freedom battles of recent years”); Liptak, supra note 187 (calling the Judith Miller case “the most serious confrontation
between the government and the press since the Pentagon Papers”).
190. See supra Part I.B.2.
191. See David Carr, Subpoenas and the Press, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2006,
at C1 (“Within the news business, there is a consensus that the roof is caving
in on the legal protections for working journalists.”); Peter Huck, Media: Will
Congress Shield the Media?, GUARDIAN (London & Manchester), Aug. 13, 2007,
at 6 (quoting Linda Foley, head of the Newspaper Guild, as commenting
“‘There’s a record number of subpoenas out there . . . . It seems like open season’”); Adam Liptak, News Media Pay in Scientist Suit, N.Y. TIMES, June 3,
2006, at A1 (“Federal courts have been increasingly hostile in recent years to
assertions by journalists that they are legally entitled to protect their confidential sources.”); McCollam, supra note 110, at 30 (“When those cases are
viewed together, many see them as constituting a moment of peril for journalism.”); Jeffrey Toobin, Name That Source, NEW YORKER, Jan. 16, 2006, at 30;
see also Impact and Perception, supra note 7, at 17–22.
192. See Theodore B. Olson, A Much-Needed Shield for Reporters, WASH.
POST, June 29, 2006, at A27 (“[I]t is now de rigueur to round up the reporters,
haul them before a court, and threaten them with heavy fines and jail sentences if they don’t cough up names and details concerning their sources.”);
David Westphal, Secrets & Subpoenas, AM. EDITOR, Mar. 2007, at 4 (reporting
on the American Society of Newspaper Editors’ summit in January 2007 and
noting that “[a]t the heart of this summit was evidence of the federal government’s growing threat to reporting—specifically in prosecutors’ willingness to
use subpoena power and jailhouse threats to force reporters to testify and
identify sources”); see also Impact and Perception, supra note 7, at 17.
193. See 2007 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 150, at 32 (testimony
of Lee Levine, Partner, Levine Sullivan Koch & Schulz, LLP) (testifying that
litigants are “emboldened” by recent legal developments); Carr, supra note 191
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The inevitable consequence of this emboldening, journalists suggest, is an increase in media subpoenas.194 The consequence of this up-tick, they continue, is a change for the worse
in the practices of American journalism. Not only are subpoenas believed to divert time and energy from newsgathering,195
they also are said to deter good reporting. The theory is that
reporters who feel threatened by subpoenas and the real possibility of jail time or substantial individual fines for noncompliance will shy away from stories that might give rise to subpoenas—especially those involving confidential sources, who
will expect them to go to jail or pay the fines rather than revealing their identities.196 Meanwhile, sources who see that
journalists increasingly lose subpoena battles will be increa(quoting Eve Burton, general counsel at the Hearst Corporation, as being concerned about a possibility that “‘[i]f the government wins in [the BALCO case],
every reporter’s notebook will be available to the government for the asking’”);
McCollam, supra note 110, at 31 (quoting Nathan Siegel, a Washington lawyer
who represents several media companies as stating, “‘[t]his is by far the most
activity I’ve ever seen attacking journalists’ sources’”).
194. See Joan Biskupic, Settlement Could Leave Issue of Reporter ‘Privilege’
Unsettled, USA TODAY, May 22, 2006, at A5 (reporting that in the Wen Ho Lee
case “[t]hirty-four news organizations . . . joined to file a brief in the case, as
did 14 states. They note a recent tide of subpoenas seeking reporters’ sources
in various cases . . . .”); Katharine Q. Seelye, Journalists Say Threat of Subpoena Intensifies, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2005, at C1 (quoting Paul J. Boyle, vice
president of Newspaper Association of America, as believing that “‘the filing of
subpoenas, as well as the letters and phone calls that media companies receive
from prosecutors and civil litigants, is on the rise’”); id. (reporting that Kurt
Wimmer, media lawyer at Covington & Burling, said he had “‘as many subpoenas against reporters in the first three months of [2005] as he had in all of
last year’”); Toobin, supra note 191, at 30 (quoting Lucy Dalglish, Executive
Director of the Reporter’s Committee for Freedom of the Press, as noting that
“‘[t]hirty-five years or so ago, reporters started getting a lot of subpoenas, and
then there was a long lull . . . . [S]tarting about two years ago we got this sudden pop.’”).
195. For greater description of newsroom leaders’ perceptions of these impacts, see Impact and Perception, supra note 7, at 17–22.
196. See Casey Murray, Under Oath: Journalists Are Under Increasing
Pressure to Testify in Court, Threatening Their Independence and Leading
Many to Consider a Federal Shield Law, NEWS MEDIA & L., Winter 2006, at
10, 11 (quoting Washington Post reporter Howard Kurtz as asserting that
“‘[e]very journalist is going through a bit of soul searching about whether to
grant anonymity to sources,’” because “‘the prospect of going to jail is no longer
a hypothetical possibility’”); Murray, supra note 149, at 16 (quoting ABC News
President David Westin as insisting that “‘[t]here are some stories . . . that we
could not report without the ability to give some protection to sources’”); Bruce
W. Sanford & Bruce D. Brown, The Futility of Chasing Leaks, WASH. POST,
July 20, 2006, at A23 (describing the “bruising battles in the federal courts
that have left the relationships between journalists and their sources more
vulnerable”).
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singly unwilling to speak on condition of confidentiality. In either instance, the result is a chilling of the free press and a
hampering of the ability to uncover important stories in the
public interest.197 Supporters of a shield law point to the avalanche of subpoenas and to the string of consequences arising
from that avalanche as evidence that legislation is needed to
protect the free flow of information.
But has the avalanche really happened? Or has the intense
publicity surrounding cases that involved mostly very large national news organizations—reporting mostly on very sensitive
national security-related topics—brought about undue alarm
over an issue that is isolated to those kinds of organizations
and those sorts of topics? This study seeks to determine whether the onslaught that is being so widely reported actually exists
and to answer the fundamental empirical questions of how
many subpoenas are faced by members of the media and who
among the media are facing them. The ongoing debate over the
propriety of a federal shield law provides the framework for the
study’s central inquiry: do the number, scope, and nature of
media subpoenas warrant federal legislation?
II. THE STUDY
Although no neutral academic study has been conducted on
the empirical question of subpoena frequency, there are some
data extant. Before the most recent string of high-profile cases,
the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, a nonprofit
group formed to support newspaper and television reporters,198
conducted six biennial surveys attempting to document the in197. See Anna Badkhen, TV Reporter Gets Confined to Home, S.F. CHRON.,
Dec. 10, 2004, at A6 (quoting Frank Smyth of the New York-based Committee
to Protect Journalists as asserting that the Taricani case is “‘going to have a
chilling effect for sources to come forward with sensitive information, and it’s
going to result in less information to the public domain’”); Paul Moore, The
Squeeze Is on for Reporters Asked to Reveal Sources, BALT. SUN, May 21, 2006,
at 2F (“[I]t is hard to deny that the independence that keeps journalists from
becoming part of the prosecutorial process is under more pressure than ever.”);
Jacques Steinberg, Setbacks on Press Protections Are Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
18, 2004, at A16 (“[W]hat legal experts characterize as an ominous trend for
journalists: the weakening of fundamental protections for the gathering and
publishing of news that had been generally viewed as settled since the Watergate era.”).
198. See About the Reporters Committee, http://www.rcfp.org/about.html
(last visited Oct. 30, 2008) (describing the Committee as a leader in “building
coalitions with other media-related organizations to protect reporters’ rights to
keep sources confidential,” “keep[ing] an eye on legislative efforts,” and submitting amicus curiae briefs on behalf of journalists).
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cidence of subpoenas served on the media.199 The surveys were
sent to television news directors and newspaper editors, who
were asked to report the total number of subpoenas received by
the newspaper or television station in a given calendar year,
and whether the subpoenas were in conjunction with federal or
state proceedings.200 Respondents also were asked to tell
whether the proceedings were criminal or civil in nature201 and
to give various details about the nature of the proceeding, the
entity issuing the subpoena, and the items sought in the subpoena.202 Respondents then specified how they dealt with the
subpoenas received and how courts responded to any challenges.203 The Reporters Committee studies concluded with data for 2001—the year often regarded as the beginning of the recent change in legal climate.204 The data collection for the 2001
study did not purport to be scientific205 or neutral,206 and the
response rates were low, with 14% of the total distributed surveys returned.207 Nevertheless, the survey results represent a
baseline of data that is ideal as to topic and timing, if imperfect
as to structure or statistical significance.
The survey in the present study was sent to the same population targeted by the Reporters Committee:208 every editor of
199. LUCY A. DALGLISH, ET AL., THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM
OF THE PRESS, A REPORT ON THE INCIDENCE OF SUBPOENAS SERVED ON THE
NEWS MEDIA IN 2001, at 1 (2003), http://www.rcfp.org/agents/agents.pdf [hereinafter 2001 REPORTERS COMMITTEE STUDY]. The report compiling data

about subpoenas received in 2001 was published in 2003. The five earlier reports were published in 1991, 1993, 1995, 1999, and 2001. Id.
200. See id. at 5, 7; id. app. A, http://www.rcfp.org/agents/app_a.html (last
visited Oct. 30, 2008) (replicating the survey instrument used to collect the data).
201. Id. at 7.
202. Id. at 8.
203. Id. at 10–11.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 172–97.
205. See 2001 REPORTERS COMMITTEE STUDY, supra note 199, at 5 (“The
figures and percentages contained in this report have not been statistically
analyzed, and no statistical generalizations have been made outside the group
of respondents.”).
206. Id. at 1 (noting that the study’s goal was “to demonstrate that journalists are, indeed, ‘differently situated’ from other targets of discovery, and that
the negative impact of subpoenas on newsgathering and dissemination was
substantial”).
207. Id. at 6 (reporting that the response rate was 16% for newspapers and
10% for broadcasters).
208. See id. at 5 (describing the 2001 Reporters Committee study surveys
being mailed to print and broadcast outlets in every state and the District of
Columbia). The data and respondent commentary analyzed in this article are
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a U.S. daily newspaper, regardless of circulation or geographic
location,209 and every news director of a U.S. television news
station affiliated with ABC, NBC, CBS, or FOX.210 A total of
1997 invitations to participate in the survey were sent, by both
U.S. mail and e-mail, in late March and early April 2007.211
Respondents were given the option of completing the survey by
U.S. mail, by e-mail, by telephone, or by logging onto the
project’s website. Respondents were asked to report numerical
data for calendar year 2006.212
With a few nonsubstantive alterations in format, the
present study adopted verbatim from the Reporters Committee
survey a set of numerical questions and a yes/no question about
whether the threat or use of subpoenas against the organization affected its policy on confidential sources.213 Some alterations were made to the earlier survey instrument and methodology to meet the current needs. First, respondents in the
present study were promised confidentiality in the reporting of
data, with general demographic and organizational-size data
gathered only for analytical purposes.214 Second, respondents in
the results of a survey independently conducted by the author. Datasets, programs, survey commentary, and additional results are on file with the author
and publicly available at http://www.law.umn.edu/lawreview/issues.html and
http://www.law.byu.edu/Law_School/Faculty_Profile?241.
209. Author sent surveys to newspaper editors as listed in EDITOR & PUBLISHER, INT’L YEARBOOK (86th ed. 2006).
210. Author sent surveys to news directors as listed in R.R. BOWKER,
BROADCASTING & CABLE YEARBOOK 2006.
211. The initial invitations to participate in the survey were timed to correspond with the annual conventions of the American Society of Newspaper
Editors and the Radio Television News Directors Association, at which the
study was announced by the author.
212. Follow-up e-mails were sent to those who had not participated as of
May 15 and June 15, 2007. One e-mail contained a link to the survey website;
the other had a Microsoft Word survey fill-in form attached. All nonrespondents were sent a follow-up letter and final e-mail notice in August 2007.
213. Compare 2001 REPORTERS COMMITTEE STUDY, supra note 199, app. A,
http://www.rcfp.org/agents/app_a.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2008), with survey
instrument distributed in present study, Questions 10–12, 17 (on file with author and available for public review at http://www.law.umn.edu/lawreview/
issues.html and http://www.law.byu.edu/Law_School/Faculty_Profile?241).
214. This was done both because federal law requires as much when studies are conducted at universities receiving federal funding, and because it
was anticipated that confidentiality might remove inhibitions that some organizations might have in discussing their subpoena situations. In contrast,
the Reporters Committee survey gave the responding organization the option
of asking that its identity be kept confidential. See 2001 REPORTERS COMMITTEE STUDY, supra note 199, at 5. Thirty-seven percent of respondents requested this anonymity; the rest of the participating organizations were listed
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the current study were asked to categorize their reported subpoenas by forum—federal or state—and to provide details within forum categories.215 Eighteen percent of respondents opted to
give only “top tier” numerical answers—that is, the total number of federal subpoenas received by the organization and the
total number of state subpoenas received by the organization—
without providing details about the source of those subpoenas,
what they sought, or how they were handled. When discussed
below, the details as to these subpoenas are listed as “unspecified.” Third, the current survey added nine new multiple-choice
questions designed to assess editor and news director perceptions of the impact of the recent high-profile cases216 and
changes in legal climate “compared to five years ago.”217
Data collection concluded in September 2007. Seven hundred sixty-one surveys were completed, making the final response rate 38%, with a greater than 50% response rate among
the one hundred largest newspapers by circulation218 and
among the twenty-five largest television stations by market
area. Three hundred forty-six responses were received through
the website, 196 by U.S. mail, 121 by e-mail, and 98 by telephone. Of the 1411 newspapers that were provided with surveys, 511 responded, for a newspaper response rate of 36.2%.
Of the 586 television stations that were provided with surveys,
250 responded, for a television response rate of 42.7%. Television responses represented 32.9% of the total surveys received;
newspaper responses represented 67.1%.219 Respondents inby name in the final report. See id. at 5; id. app. B, http://www.rcfp.org/agents/
app_b.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2008) (listing participating organizations).
215. Compare id. app. A, http://www.rcfp.org/agents/app_a.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2008) (Question 3), with survey instrument distributed in
present study (Questions 10–12) (on file with author and available for public
review at http://www.law.umn.edu/lawreview/issues.html and http://www.law
.byu.edu/Law_School/Faculty_Profile?241). The Reporters Committee survey
had asked a single forum question, asking only for the total number of subpoenas received that arose out of federal proceedings and out of state proceedings. Aiming to better inform the debate over a federal shield law, the survey
in the current study asked that the federal and state subpoenas be reported
separately and that details about the subpoenas’ sources, topics, and handling
be given by forum category.
216. The data gathered in these “perception questions” are discussed more
fully in Impact and Perception, supra note 7, at 17.
217. The questions were asked in 2007; thus “five years ago,” when referenced in this article, refers to the period since 2002.
218. Responses were received from six of the largest ten newspapers by circulation and fifty-nine of the top one hundred.
219. By comparison, the 2001 study received 319 responses, for a response
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cluded stations from all Nielsen television market-size categories and newspapers from all Editor & Publisher newspapercirculation categories, and, as demonstrated in Figure 1, the
proportion of the respondents found in each market-size and
circulation category was roughly representative of the proportion of organizations from those categories found in the total
population. Responses were received from the District of Columbia and from every state except Delaware.220
Figure 1. Summary of Survey Participants and General
Population
Media by Category

Proportion of
Respondent
Group

Proportion of
General
Population

Broadcast Market Size (Households)
Under 100,000
100,000–250,000

7.2%
28.8%

9.0%
24.9%

250,000–500,000
500,000–1,000,000

29.6%
18.4%

27.5%
20.1%

> 1,000,000

16.0%

18.4%

Under 10,000
10,000–25,000

34.2%
27.8%

43.2%
28.4%

25,000–50,000
50,000–100,000

15.7%
10.2%

13.6%
7.5%

100,000–250,000
250,000–500,000

8.0%
2.7%

4.7%
1.7%

> 500,000

1.4%

0.8%

Newspaper Circulation

Survey-response data were analyzed using STATA/IC 10.0
statistical software, in which numerical totals were tabulated
and percentages of actual responses were calculated. In an effort to directly parallel the 2001 methodology, surveys were
sent to the whole population of editors and news directors, and
participation was voluntary. The methodology is imperfect as a
tool for making comparisons with the 2001 Reporters Committee survey or for noting trends based on the responses to that
rate of 14%. Eighty-two of the responses were from television broadcasters and
237 were from newspapers. 2001 REPORTERS COMMITTEE STUDY, supra note
199, at 5.
220. The 2001 study did not receive responses from Delaware, Hawaii,
Rhode Island, or Wyoming. Id. at 7.
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earlier study because, although the total starting population
was identical, the respondents in the two studies may have
been from different segments of that population.
Two efforts were made to overcome this imperfection. First,
in an effort to predict responses for the total population using
actual responses, results were analyzed in STATA using a
standard mechanism for countering nonresponse bias. A logistic regression was performed using a set of factors known about
all media organizations in the population: (1) form of media
(newspaper or television broadcaster); (2) state in which the organization is located; (3) circulation or market size; (4) the existence of a state shield statute; and (5) whether or not the organization responded to the survey. Based on these factors,
responses were weighted by the inverse of the probability of response, so as to minimize nonresponse bias and make results
more generalizable to the total population. Except where specified otherwise, all results reported in this article are responses
that have been weighted in this way, giving a truer picture of
the current experiences and beliefs of all newsroom leaders in
the country.
Second, data analysis was performed on a group of respondents who participated in both the 2001 study and the current
study. The Reporters Committee study made public the names
of survey participants except in cases in which respondents requested anonymity.221 One hundred seventeen of the 319 participating news organizations in 2001 requested anonymity;
202 had their identities made public.222 One hundred forty-four
of these 202 organizations identified as participants in the 2001
study also participated in the current study. This subgroup—
45% of the total 2001 respondents—are referred to in this article as the Comparison Group.223 Comparison Group analysis
provides an additional mechanism for tracking numerical

221. See id. at 5; id. app. B, http://www.rcfp.org/agents/app_b.html (last
visited Oct. 30, 2008) (listing participating organizations).
222. See id. at 5.
223. The Comparison Group contained a mix of television news directors
and newspaper editors roughly proportionate to the mix contained in the entire group of 2001 respondents. Of the 319 total 2001 respondents, 237 (74%)
were newspaper editors. Of the 144 Comparison Group members, 104 (72%)
are newspaper editors. Of the 2001 respondents, eighty-two (26%) were television news directors. Of the Comparison Group members, forty (28%) are television news directors.
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trends over the five-year period and for confirming apparent
changes in frequency and impact suggested by other data.224
III. STUDY RESULTS
This survey aimed to answer the central unanswered questions in the legislative debates: How many subpoenas are being
issued to the press in the United States and who among the
media is receiving them? With its snapshot of the national experience for a single year, the survey provides a look at both
the depth and the breadth of the media-subpoena situation.
This snapshot suggests that, while the news media is not experiencing the “avalanche”225 of subpoenas that some have described, there does appear to have been some increase in both
the frequency and the impact of subpoenas over the five-year
period of the study. Further, some apparent trends among federal subpoenas and, especially, confidential-material subpoenas, suggest that federal legislation would be a plausible response to an actual need and not merely a “solution in search of
a problem.”226
A. SUBPOENA-FREQUENCY DATA
The 761 responding news organizations participating in
the study reported that their “reporters, editors or other news
employees” received a total of 3062 “subpoenas seeking information or material relating to newsgathering” in calendar year
2006. Weighting responses to estimate actual values for the entire population suggests that a total of 7244 subpoenas were received by all daily newspapers and network-affiliated television
news operations in the United States that year.
Subpoenas were reported by media organizations in Washington, D.C. and all forty-nine reporting states,227 and by news224. Although it is impossible to deduce the specific characteristics of the
anonymous participants in the 2001 study, it can be noted that the identified
organizations (and the Comparison Group formed from these organizations)
are organizations with comparatively small circulations and market sizes, and
it might be speculated that larger organizations with greater numbers of subpoenas were more likely to request anonymity. Thus, trends seen in the Comparison Group arguably are understated, and would be even more pronounced
if the full population of 2001 respondents was available for analysis.
225. 2007 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 150, at 88 (statement of
Rep. Pence, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
226. 2006 Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 4, at 107 (statement of
Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen. of the United States).
227. Media subpoena experiences varied widely from state to state. Massa-
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papers of every circulation category and broadcasters in every
market size. An analysis of the distribution of subpoenas
among media organizations shows that greater than half of the
761 responding organizations reported receiving one or more
subpoenas. The vast majority of those received subpoenas in
single-digit amounts, although almost 10% received greater
than ten, and two survey respondents—both broadcasters—
reported receiving more than one hundred subpoenas. The
largest total number reported was 160. When responses are
weighted and generalized to the entire population, the data
suggest that 51.3% of media organizations received no subpoenas in 2006, 32.1% received between one and five, 8.0% received between six and ten, 6.3% received between ten and
twenty-five, and 2.3% received greater than twenty-five.
Figure 2. Distribution of Respondents by Number of
Subpoenas Received

chusetts organizations reported the largest average number of subpoenas per
news organization (18.4), followed by Louisiana (18.0), and Washington, D.C.
(11.3). The states with the smallest subpoena averages per organization were
Vermont (0.4), Wyoming (0.4), New Hampshire (0.3), and Alaska (0.1). Complete state-by-state data is on file with author and available for public review
at http://www.law.umn.edu/lawreview/issues.html and http://www.law.byu
.edu/Law_School/Faculty_Profile?241.
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Figure 3. Proportion of News Organizations by Number of
Subpoenas Received

Newsroom leaders’ responses lean heavily toward a belief
that both raw numbers and subpoena risk have increased. Sixty-four percent of all newsroom leaders believe the frequency of
media subpoenas to be greater than it was five years ago. Nearly half believe the risk of their own organization receiving a
subpoena is greater than it was five years ago, while only 6%
believe the risk to be less. Some rudimentary trend data appear
to support this belief. The average number of subpoenas reported per respondent in this study was 4.02. Weighted to account for nonresponses, the data suggest that the average
number of subpoenas received per news organization in the
United States in 2006 was 3.6. The 144 members of the Comparison Group reported a total of 464 subpoenas, for an average
of 3.22 subpoenas per respondent. In answers to identical numerical questions asked in the Reporters Committee survey
five years earlier, the average number of subpoenas per respondent was 2.6.228
1. Newspapers vs. Television Broadcasters
Survey responses were grouped by medium for an additional analytical assessment. Using the 2001 data as a rough
baseline, it appears that both newspapers and broadcasters
have experienced increases in the number of subpoenas re228. See 2001 REPORTERS COMMITTEE STUDY, supra note 199, at 6.
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ceived.229 While newspapers receive more of the potentially
complicated subpoenas dealing with confidential material than
do their television counterparts,230 television stations bear a
significantly greater burden in terms of numbers of subpoenas
received—most likely because subpoenaing attorneys seek material with a strong visual impact on juries.231 Weighted to account for nonresponses, the data suggest that the average total
number of subpoenas per television news operation is ten times
the average per newspaper. In 2006, newspapers received an
average of 0.9 subpoenas each, while the average number of
subpoenas per television news operation was 10.2.232 The largest number of subpoenas reported by any newspaper respondent was sixteen; the largest received by any broadcaster was
ten times greater: 160. In raw numbers, even though there are
more than twice as many daily newspapers as there are network-affiliated television news operations, more than four
times as many subpoenas are issued to the latter than to the
former. An extrapolation of the reported data to the entire population indicates that newspapers received a total of 1313 subpoenas in 2006, while broadcasters received a total of 5931.233
229. See id. at 11. The 2001 study found an average of 7.7 subpoenas per
broadcast respondent; weighted for nonresponse, the present study found 10.2
subpoenas per broadcast outlet. The 2001 study found an average of 0.7 subpoenas per newspaper respondent; weighted for nonresponse, the present
study found 0.9 subpoenas per newspaper. In 2001, 79% of the responding
broadcasters received at least one subpoena. The present study found that
86.4% of all broadcasters received at least one. In 2001, 32% of responding
newspapers received at least one subpoena. The present study found that
38.0% of all newspapers received at least one.
230. See infra Part III.C.
231. Many broadcaster respondents made this point in the comments sections of the survey. Many resent what they see as being unfairly taken advantage of for these purposes. One typical comment:
Civil attorneys are using tv stations to conduct discovery and relying
on our video of car wrecks and accidents for a dramatic effect in court.
They can get all the relevant information they need from police reports and such, but in short, want video of a mangled car to show to
the jury. Prosecutors are lazy and would rather subpoena a tv station’s video of a chase, for example, instead of having numerous officers subpoenaed and patrol car video dubbed. TV stations are being
overburdened with these types of subpoenas.
232. Subpoenas to broadcasters account for 82.9% of all federal subpoenas
issued to the media and account for 80% of all state subpoenas issued to the
media in 2006.
233. This dichotomy very closely mirrors the situation described by the Reporters Committee in its 2001 study. The eighty-two television stations participating in that study reported a total of 638 subpoenas (79% received one or
more during the year). 2001 REPORTERS COMMITTEE STUDY, supra note 199,
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Perhaps even more notable is the breadth of subpoena distribution among television broadcasters in comparison to the
distribution among newspapers. Two-thirds of all newspapers
in the country did not receive any subpoenas at all in 2006.
Conversely, 85.9% of all television news operations received at
least one subpoena in 2006. Anecdotally, in survey comment
sections, broadcasters speak of subpoenas as “routine,” “an unfortunate, but regular, part of what we do,” and something that
“happens all the time.” One large television station’s news director noted, “We receive a subpoena almost weekly and it has
been like this at all the other stations in the country for which I
have worked.”
Although they receive far fewer subpoenas than broadcasters, newspaper editors’ anecdotal descriptions of the process of
subpoena compliance almost uniformly characterize it as a significantly greater imposition than television news editors do.234
Nearly all newspaper editors who described their subpoena experiences indicated that the disruption was major and that the
personnel involved were numerous, ranging from the reporter
or photographer to lower-level editors and, in many instances,
to top editors and publishers. Conversely, a very large number
of television news director respondents described a policy of automatically complying with all requests for material that actually aired—and treating such a subpoena as a dubbing request like any other that might come from the public, for which
a standard fee is charged. Some noted that the subpoena situation is not entirely parallel to the dubbing-service situation because the former requires a letter from the newsroom certifying
the authenticity of the footage or, more disruptively, actual testimony from the videographer, reporter, or news director.
Broadcasters did express much greater concern about subpoenas seeking material other than that which was already was
aired.235 But the mere issuance of a subpoena appears to be less
alarming to those in broadcast newsrooms than to those at
newspapers.

at 6. The 237 participating newspapers received a total of 185 subpoenas (32%
received one or more during the year). Id.
234. For a more detailed discussion of the reported impact of subpoenas on
the newsgathering process, see Impact and Perception, supra note 7, at 23.
235. See infra note 305.

2008]

NEWS MEDIA SUBPOENAS

631

2. Subpoenas and Organizational Size
Although promised confidentiality, survey respondents
were asked to provide demographic data, including circulation
size for newspapers and market size for television news operations. The numerical data were grouped by organizational size
for further analysis.
As shown in Figure 4, when weighted to account for nonresponses, the data demonstrate that the likelihood of receiving
a subpoena increases with newspaper circulation size. Small
papers report starkly different experiences than do larger papers. More than 80% of newspapers with a circulation under
10,000 and more than 70% of newspapers with a circulation between 10,000 and 25,000 received no subpoenas in 2006.236
Conversely, every newspaper with a circulation over 500,000
received at least one subpoena in that year, as did 85.7% and
82.9%, respectively, of newspapers with circulations between
250,000 and 500,000 and circulations between 100,000 and
250,000. However, as demonstrated in Figure 5, because smallcirculation newspapers make up a very large percentage of the
total newspaper population, the proportion of all newspaper
subpoenas that is received by smaller newspapers is equal to or
greater than the proportion received by those in larger circulation categories. As shown in Figures 6 and 7, respectively, these
same correlations between newspaper size and number of subpoenas received exist within the subgroup of state subpoenas
received, but not within the subgroup of federal subpoenas received, for which organizations from the top three newspapercirculation categories received a greater proportion of the subpoenas.
Similar size trends also exist among television stations. Although the smallest broadcast organizations are overwhelmingly more likely to receive a subpoena than the smallest newspapers—66.2% of those in markets with fewer than 100,000
households received one or more subpoenas in 2006—they are
less likely to receive a subpoena than larger television news operations. Nearly 90% of stations with market sizes of more than
236. In survey comments, respondents from these small and very small
newspapers confirmed that subpoenas are exceptionally rare:
“We have not had a subpoena in all my years at the paper.”
“My family has owned this newspaper for three generations, and do not
believe we have gotten a single subpoena.”
“We are a small community newspaper and do not ever receive subpoenas.”
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one million households and 91% of stations with market sizes
between 500,000 and one million households received at least
one subpoena in 2006. Larger stations also are experiencing
greater total numbers of subpoenas than their smaller counterparts. Just over sixty percent of all subpoenas received by television news operations were received by broadcasters in market
areas of 500,000 households or more. These broadcasters were
the recipients of six of every ten state subpoenas to television
newsrooms and seven of every ten federal subpoenas to television newsrooms.
Figure 4. Newspaper Reception of Subpoenas by Circulation

Figure 5. Proportion of Subpoenas Received by Newspaper
Circulation
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Figure 6. Proportion of State Subpoenas Received by
Newspaper Circulation

Figure 7. Proportion of Federal Subpoenas Received by
Newspaper Circulation
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Figure 8. Broadcaster Reception of Subpoenas by Market Size

Figure 9. Proportion of Subpoenas Received by Broadcast
Market Size
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Figure 10. Proportion of State Subpoenas Received by
Broadcast Market Size

Figure 11. Proportion of Federal Subpoenas Received by
Broadcast Market Size

A linear analysis of organizational size and number of subpoenas received shows a positive relationship between the total
number of subpoenas received by a newspaper organization and
the size of the organization and a very strong positive relationship between the number of subpoenas received by a broadcaster and the size of the organization. The average number of
subpoenas per newspaper with a circulation under 10,000
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(0.36) is seventeen times lower than the average per newspaper
with a circulation between 250,000 and 500,000 (6.36). While
television news operations in markets with fewer than 100,000
households received an average of 4.99 subpoenas per organization, those in markets with greater than one million households
received an average of 18.94 per organization.
Figure 12. Average Number of Subpoenas Received by
Newspaper Circulation

Figure 13. Average Number of Subpoenas Received by
Broadcaster Market Size

2008]

NEWS MEDIA SUBPOENAS

637

Thus, it appears that for newspapers, the brunt of the subpoena burden is borne by the one hundred or so largest organizations, perhaps because these newspapers produce a greater
volume of news material each day, or perhaps because they are
more likely to have full-time investigative reporting teams,
budgets that can support in-depth work, and reporters with
connections to officials in cases of significant legal import.
Among broadcasters, subpoenas are a reality for almost all
mid- and large-sized stations and for a large percentage of
small stations, because attorneys in a wide variety of cases
seek visually compelling evidence to put before juries.237
B. FEDERAL-SUBPOENA DATA
Because recent high-profile cases and current legislative
debates have been federal in their focus, the numerical portion
of the survey asked respondents to categorize the received subpoenas as arising out of federal proceedings or state proceedings and to describe the nature, handling, and resolution of
these subpoenas separately by forum category. Consistent with
past trends,238 and as would be expected given the significantly
larger number of state courts than federal courts, subpoenas
issued in connection with state proceedings greatly outnumbered those issued in connection with federal proceedings.
However, analysis of the survey data suggests that federal subpoenas may be both more frequent than they were five years
ago and more common than opponents of a federal shield law
have suggested.
Ninety-one responding media organizations reported receiving one or more federal subpoenas in calendar year 2006.
Sixteen organizations reported receiving five or more. All told,
in actual numbers from the 38% of the nation’s media outlets
that responded to the survey, there were a reported 335 federal
subpoenas issued in 2006. Because an additional 529 reported
subpoenas were not specified as either federal or state, the true
number of federal subpoenas could be even greater. Sixty-four
237. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
238. See 2001 REPORTERS COMMITTEE STUDY, supra note 199, at 7 (indicating that 706 of the 823 subpoenas reported in 2001 (86%) arose in state court
proceedings, while 74 (9%) were issued in proceedings in a federal court (5%
were unspecified)). In the current study, 2198 of the 3062 reported subpoenas
(71.8%) arose out of state court proceedings and 335 (10.9%) arose out of federal proceedings (17.3% were unspecified). When the data are weighted to account for nonresponses, federal subpoenas represent 13.1% of all subpoenas
received.
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federal subpoenas were reported by newspapers; 271 were reported by television broadcasters. Extrapolating to the larger
population, the statistically weighted data suggest that at least
774 federal subpoenas were issued to the press in 2006—132
(17.1%) to newspapers and 642 (82.9%) to television news operations.239
Nearly twice as many federal subpoenas per respondent
were reported in the current study than in the 2001 study.240
Moreover, the survey results and respondent commentary indicate that federal subpoenas in the United States are having an
increasing impact on newsroom practices across the country
and are casting a wider net than the high-profile media organizations involved in the recently publicized cases. Weighted responses suggest that 10.3% of all media organizations in the
country received at least one federal subpoena in 2006. To be
sure, larger media organizations face federal subpoenas with
much greater frequency. Close to 70% of the federal subpoenas
reported by newspapers were reported by the one hundred
largest of the more than 1400 daily newspapers in the country,
and more than half of the federal subpoenas issued to broadcasters were issued to those in markets of one million households
or more.241 But federal subpoenas were not limited to those major news outlets. Mid-sized organizations are receiving them
with some regularity. Nearly 10% of newspapers with circulations between 50,000 and 100,000 received a federal subpoena
in 2006; so did more than 20% of television newsrooms in markets of between 250,000 and 500,000 households. In all, federal
subpoenas were issued to media organizations in thirty-two
states and the District of Columbia and to newspapers and television news outlets in every circulation and market size.

239. By comparison, analysis of the data weighted for nonresponses suggests that a total of at least 5151 state subpoenas were issued to the media in
2006. Eighty percent (4125) were issued to broadcasters; 20% (1026) were issued to newspapers.
240. In the 2001 study, the Reporters Committee found 0.23 federal subpoenas per respondent. 2001 REPORTERS COMMITTEE STUDY, supra note 199,
at 5, 7 (dividing the number of federal subpoenas (74) by the number of respondents (319)). This study found 0.44 federal subpoenas per respondent. The
Comparison Group reported a slight increase from five years ago, with an average of 0.28 per respondent. Weighted to account for nonresponses, the data
suggest an average of 0.39 federal subpoenas per media organization.
241. See supra fig.11.
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Figure 14. Newspaper Reception of Federal Subpoenas by
Circulation

Figure 15. Broadcaster Reception of Federal Subpoenas by
Market Size

The substance of federal subpoenas is greatly varied, too.
Beyond the high-profile national-security stories and governmental leaks that result in Privacy Act cases—the stuff of
which the recent headlines were made242—media organizations
in the United States report facing federal subpoenas related to
immigration matters, employment discrimination suits, the
242. See supra Part I.C.
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prosecution of federal drug crimes, securities cases, civil rights
actions, and even civil suits arising out of automobile accidents
that took place in Washington, D.C. If 2006 is a representative
year, it would appear that reporters and their organizations are
spending time, energy, and money dealing with subpoenas in a
wide variety of federal cases, and that a federal shield law—
even one with a strong national-security exception—could be
expected to have a meaningful impact upon journalism.
When asked to describe generally “how much time and resources were expended on subpoenas” with which they complied, some respondents differentiated between federal and
state subpoenas—and uniformly commented that federal subpoenas required more time and had a significantly greater impact on newsroom operations.243 When asked to compare time
and resources spent dealing with subpoenas today compared
with five years ago, 62.2% of news organizations that received
federal subpoenas report that the time spent is either somewhat or significantly greater. This figure is more than two-anda-half times greater than the percentage of those receiving no
federal subpoenas who report an increase, as demonstrated in
Figure 16.
Survey respondents were given the option of specifying the
kind of proceeding in which the subpoena arose and the entity
that issued the subpoena. A total of 160 federal subpoenas were
specified as having arisen in connection with federal criminal
matters.244 Of those, seventy-eight were reported to have been
issued by federal prosecutors, three by special prosecutors, sixty by defense attorneys, and one by federal law enforcement.245
These raw-number totals, if weighted to account for nonresponses, suggest that at least246 175 subpoenas were issued by
the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division in calendar year
243. One newsroom leader who reported handling state subpoenas with
limited disruption to the news process also reported that “[t]he federal subpoena consumed at least five hours a week of my time for several months.”
Another who said that state subpoenas took, on average, an hour for compliance reported: “We complied with [a] federal subpoena. About 20 hours of
staff time.” Others commented:
“We feel protected in [this state’s] state courts in regards to subpoenas.
We feel very vulnerable in federal court.”
“Courts are somewhat more protective locally, but not nationally. On a
national level, it is much less protective.”
244. For overall data on who issued subpoenas, see infra Part III.E.
245. Eleven respondents answered “Don’t Know.”
246. Because the type of proceeding was unspecified for 26.3% of the reported federal subpoenas, the true number may well be greater.
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2006 alone—a number that sheds greater light on the activity
of the Department than does the Justice Department’s narrow
testimony that the division has “approved subpoenas to the
media seeking source-related information in only 19 cases since
1991,” only four of which “have occurred since 2001.”247
Figure 16. Time and Resources Expended on Federal
Subpoenas Compared to Five Years Ago

The data gathered on the question of federal subpoenas
seeking confidential material likewise offer a clearer empirical
picture than has been available thus far. Actual respondents
representing 38% of the nation’s news organizations reported a
total of twenty-one federal subpoenas seeking names of confidential sources in 2006. They reported thirteen federal subpoenas that sought other information received on condition of confidentiality,248 for a total of thirty-four actually reported federal
subpoenas demanding confidential material. Weighted to account for nonresponses and extrapolated to the entire population, the data suggest confidential material was sought in a
federal subpoena at least sixty-seven times in 2006, and that in
forty-one of these instances, the name of a confidential source
was sought.
247. 2007 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 150, at 18 (testimony of
Rachel Brand, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States).
248. For details on confidential-material data, see infra Part III.C.
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It is worth noting that while federal subpoenas represent
only about 10% of the total reported subpoenas, federal subpoenas seeking the names of confidential sources represent
nearly 50% of the total subpoenas seeking the names of confidential sources,249 meaning reporters are facing this situation
in federal courts as often as they are facing it in the state
courts of all fifty states, where even the barest of reporter’s privilege regimes provide a privilege for material obtained under a
promise of confidentiality.250
Further, demographic data gathered in connection with the
numerical responses show that federal subpoenas seeking confidential material were received by news organizations outside
the major national media, including at mid-sized television
news operations, 50,000-circulation newspapers, and media organizations in Georgia, Colorado, Kentucky, and Arizona—all
of which, again, suggest that a federal shield law’s protection
would serve journalists nationally, and not merely the handful
of top-tier news organizations that have been involved in the
highest profile cases in recent years.
More to the point, these numbers, representing a single calendar year, stand in stark contrast to the nineteen incidents in
the past fifteen years in which the Department of Justice’s
Criminal Division reports it has sought source-related information—particularly because such a large percentage of federal
subpoenas appear to have arisen in the criminal setting. At a
minimum, the numbers indicate that the incidence of federal
subpoenas in general and federal subpoenas seeking sourcerelated material in particular may not be as rare as opponents
of a shield law suggest.
C. CONFIDENTIAL-MATERIAL DATA
One of the clearest trends appearing in the data relates to
subpoenas seeking confidential material. The results suggest a
dramatic increase since 2001 in reported subpoenas seeking
material that a reporter obtained under a promise of confidentiality.
The Reporters Committee 2001 study indicated that just
two of the 823 reported subpoenas in that survey had de249. Twenty-one federal subpoenas seeking the names of confidential
sources were reported; twenty-two state subpoenas sought them. See infra
Part III.C.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 28–29; infra text accompanying
notes 280–82.
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manded the identity of a confidential source and that four had
requested other information obtained under a promise of confidentiality, for a total of six instances of subpoenas seeking confidential material.251 These subpoenas represented well under
1% of the total subpoenas reported.252
Respondents in the present survey reported ninety-seven
instances in which subpoenas sought information obtained under a promise of confidentiality.253 Although the percentage of
total subpoenas seeking this information remains small, this
number represents a more than four-fold increase from 2001 in
the percentage of requests for confidential material.254 Extrapolating with weighted values to account for nonresponses, the
current data suggest there were a total of 213 instances in
which confidential information was sought in media subpoenas
in calendar year 2006 alone, ninety-two of which sought the
name of a confidential source. The conclusion that confidentialmaterial subpoena requests have increased is further supported by an analysis of the Comparison Group. These 144 respondents, who represent just 45% of the participants of the
2001 study, report a total of nineteen instances in which subpoenas sought confidential material in 2006—more than three
times as many as were reported by the full 319 respondents in
the earlier study.
A total of forty-three actually reported subpoenas from
2006 sought the names of confidential sources. Twenty-one of
these were in conjunction with federal proceedings; twenty-two
were in conjunction with state proceedings. A total of fifty-four
reported subpoenas sought other information obtained under a
promise of confidentiality. Thirteen of these were in conjunction with federal proceedings; forty-one in conjunction with
state proceedings. While, as a general matter, broadcasters are
receiving significantly greater numbers of subpoenas than
newspapers, newspapers are facing a disproportionately large
percentage of the subpoenas that seek material obtained under
a promise of confidentiality. Newspapers received 54.9% of the

251. See 2001 REPORTERS COMMITTEE STUDY, supra note 199, at 5, 9.
252. Id.
253. See infra fig.17.
254. The 2001 study reported 6 instances of confidential material being requested in a total of 823 subpoenas (0.73%). 2001 REPORTERS COMMITTEE
STUDY, supra note 199, at 5, 9. The current study reports 97 instances of confidential material being requested in a total of 3062 subpoenas (3.17%). See
infra fig.17; supra Part III.A.
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reported confidential-material subpoenas; 45.1% were received
by television newsrooms.
Anecdotally, respondents told of a noticeable up-tick in
subpoenas seeking confidential material—and of a concomitant
increase in time, resources, and money spent dealing with
them.255 If confidential sources can be integral to the acquisition of the news—as courts,256 commentators,257 and legislators258 routinely have recognized—these trends may be cause
for concern. If the press needs to utilize confidential sources
and information in order to act as a watchdog of government,259
or if, as many within the industry have suggested,260 it is only
255. One respondent sharing this sentiment wrote: “We have expended a
great deal of time and resources on subpoenas for confidential sources in the
last several years—more so than at any time before.” Another wrote that an
increase in confidential-material subpoenas within the study period has meant
that “the publisher, the executive editor, the managing editor, and approximately 10–15 reporters and editors have had to spend significant amounts of
time consulting with counsel and preparing to give or giving testimony.”
256. See, e.g., Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“Compelling a reporter to disclose the identity of a source may significantly interfere
with this news gathering ability; journalists frequently depend on informants
to gather news, and confidentiality is often essential to establishing a relationship with an informant.”); cf., e.g., Gonzales v. Nat’l Broadcasting Co., 194
F.3d 29, 35–36 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that confidential sources should have
greater protection than nonconfidential sources while also recognizing a qualified privilege for nonconfidential sources).
257. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 170, at 102 (“Journalists use confidential sources to gather important news and information that they would not be
able to obtain through other means.”); Lee, supra note 169, at 685 ( “Coverage
of national security is an area where confidential sources are especially vital.”).
258. See, e.g., 2006 Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 4, at 96 (statement of Sen. Leahy, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“[I]nvestigative
journalism is the essence of the First Amendment. Investigative journalism is
how whistleblowers, skeptics and dissenters get out the facts that they know
to the public.”); July 2005 Hearing, supra note 116 (statement of Sen. Feingold, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (noting that “anonymous sources
have been too important to exposing government and corporate wrongdoing” to
not protect them).
259. See Kirtley, supra note 46, at 523–25; Potter Stewart, “Or of the
Press,” 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 631–33 (1975). See generally TIMOTHY W. GLEASON, THE WATCHDOG CONCEPT: THE PRESS AND THE COURTS IN NINETEENTHCENTURY AMERICA (1990); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First
Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 538–44, 591–611 (1978).
260. See, e.g., Alicia C. Shepard, Anonymous Sources, AM. JOURNALISM
REV., Dec. 1994, at 20 (quoting Bob Woodward of the Washington Post as saying “‘The job of a journalist, particularly someone who’s spent time dealing in
sensitive areas, is to find out what really happened. . . . When you are reporting on inside the White House, the Supreme Court, the CIA or the Pentagon,
you tell me how you’re going to get stuff on the record. Look at the good report-
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by making meaningful connections with the most significant
confidential sources that investigative reporters are able to uncover governmental wrongdoing and produce stories that serve
the public interest,261 then an increase in confidential-material
subpoenas might signal a trend warranting legislative remedy.262 Citing major historical examples like Watergate,263 and
ing out of any of those institutions—it’s not on the record.’”); see also Peter
Johnson, Should Reporters Give Up a Confidential Source?, USA TODAY, Aug.
25, 2004, at B14 (noting that a freelance writer stated that promises of confidentiality are just as necessary to a reporter as grants of immunity to confidential informants are to law enforcement officials, so that they can perform
their jobs).
261. See, e.g., Affidavit of Carl Bernstein in Support of the Motion to Quash
Subpoenas by Mark Fainaru-Wada and Lance Williams, ¶ 8, In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas, Mark Fainaru and Lance Williams, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D.
Cal. 2006) (No. CR 06-90225 JSW) (noting that “the uninformed public will
suffer as a result” of not protecting confidential sources); Affidavit of Jack Nelson in Support of the Motion to Quash and/or for a Protective Order by Fainaru-Wada and Lance Williams, ¶ 4, In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, Mark Fainaru-Wada and Lance Williams, No. CR 06-90225 JSW (N.D. Cal. 2006) (“In
order to fully report on stories on many subjects, especially in order to learn of
activities that otherwise would have been shielded from the public, I often
found it necessary to rely on confidential sources.”) (on file with author); Affidavit of Michael Parks in Support of the Motion to Quash Subpoenas by Mark
Fainaru-Wada and Lance Williams, ¶¶ 5–6, In re Grand Jury Subpoenas,
Mark Fainaru-Wada and Lance Williams, No. CR 06-90225 JSW (N.D. Cal.
2006) (“Journalists have an honor-bound commitment to protect people who
are acting in good faith from reprisals.”) (on file with author); cf. Project for
Excellence in Journalism, Content Analysis, in THE STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA 2005: AN ANNUAL REPORT ON AMERICAN JOURNALISM, JOURNALISM.ORG,
http://stateofthenewsmedia.org/2005/narrative_overview_contentanalysis.asp?
cat=2&media (stating that 13% of front-page newspaper articles included confidential sources). This study analyzed approximately 16,800 stories, including
6589 newspaper stories. See Project for Excellence in Journalism, PEJ Media
Report Card, Content Analysis, General Methodology, in THE STATE OF THE
NEWS MEDIA 2005: AN ANNUAL REPORT ON AMERICAN JOURNALISM, JOURNALISM.ORG, http://stateofthemedia.org/2005/methodology.asp.
262. See Editorial, Contradictory Stance: While Officials Call for Journalistic Freedom, Subpoenas for BALCO Reporters Send an Opposite Message,
HOUS. CHRON., May 20, 2006, at B8 (discussing issuance of subpoenas to journalists and noting that it is “creating a national atmosphere that makes investigative reporting more difficult and whistleblowers more fearful about talking
to journalists”); Op-Ed, Jailing Reporters, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2004, at A30
(“[The Taricani case] is part of a rash of recent cases in which judges are seeking to force journalists to renege on promises of confidentiality . . . .”).
263. KATHARINE GRAHAM, PERSONAL HISTORY 471 (1998) (describing how
the Washington Post relied heavily on confidential sources during reporting on
Watergate); see also Blasi, supra note 62, at 251–53 (noting that at the time of
publication in 1971, stories about operations of government most heavily relied on promises of confidentiality, in comparison to other categories of reporting, and that nearly one-third of these stories depended on “regular” confidential sources).
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more recent examples like the stories exposing Abu Ghraib
misdeeds and revealing mismanagement at Walter Reed Hospital,264 journalists have argued that major stories only come to
the public attention when confidential sources talk to reporters.
Even while agreeing that credibility dictates that confidential
information be used with caution, many argue that it is critically important to preserve the freedom to use it.265 Although
some have contended that the ongoing ability of the media to
produce these major investigative pieces—all in the absence of
a federal shield law—suggests that the legal climate is not unduly oppressive and that the federal legislation is unnecessary,266 the data pointing to an increase in confidentialmaterial subpoenas remain notable, in that even the most limited of state reporter’s privilege regimes protect this kind of
material.267 Indeed, some state shield laws protect reporters only from having to reveal confidential information.268
Study results also indicate that confidential-material subpoenas are not limited to the largest media organizations or
those with strong national news coverage. As demonstrated by
Figure 17, subpoenas seeking confidential material were re264. July 2005 Hearing, supra note 116 (testimony of Lee Levine, Partner,
Levine Sullivan Koch & Schulz, LLP) (noting that the sources of an early Abu
Ghraib story only would speak on condition of anonymity); 153 CONG. REC.
H11591 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2007) (statement of Rep. Berkley) (“Without this
protection [to sources of journalists and broadcasters], stories involving conditions at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center, prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib,
and the unmasking of the culprits behind the Enron scandal might never have
been written.”).
265. See October 2005 Hearing, supra note 116 (testimony of Judith Miller,
Reporter, New York Times) (“If journalists cannot be trusted by sources to
guarantee confidentiality, then journalists cannot function and there cannot
be a free press. . . . All are entitled to anonymity if they are telling the truth
and have something of importance to say to the American people. Reporters
rarely know when they extend a pledge of confidentiality to a good-faith source
what the impact of the information being provided will be.”).
266. See 2007 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 150, at 52 (testimony
of Randall Eliason, Professor, George Washington University Law School)
(“Major stories from Watergate and Iran Contra up through Abu Ghraib, secret CIA prisons, and unlawful surveillance by the Government, all have been
reported without a Federal privilege law.”); see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 693–95 (1972) (refusing to recognize a connection between a lack of
privilege and the obstruction of flow of news to the public).
267. See infra text accompanying note 280.
268. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 919.1-2 (1997). The Arizona statute has been limited to confidential sources by
subsequent case law. Matera v. Superior Court, 825 P.2d 971 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1992). In New Mexico, the Rules of Evidence limit the reporter’s privilege to
confidential information or sources. N.M.R. ANN. 11-514 (2008).
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ceived by television broadcasters in every market size and by
newspapers in all but the very smallest circulation category
(under 10,000). They were reported by organizations in twentytwo states and the District of Columbia.
Figure 17. Summary of Recipients of Subpoenas Seeking
Confidential Material
Who Received Subpoenas for Confidential Material?
(Number of requests made to survey respondents)
States
Arkansas (1)
Arizona (2)
California (10)
Colorado (1)
District of Columbia (10)
Florida (12)
Georgia (1)
Indiana (2)
Kentucky (5)
Massachusetts (2)
Maryland (2)
Michigan (1)
North Carolina (1)
New Hampshire (2)
New Jersey (1)
New Mexico (2)
New York (15)
Oregon (4)
Pennsylvania (1)
Tennessee (3)
Texas (16)
Virginia (2)
Wisconsin (1)

Broadcasters
by market size

Newspapers
by circulation

< 100,000 (4)

< 10,000 (0)

100,000–
250,000 (8)

10,000–
25,000 (4)

250,000–
500,000 (5)

25,000–
50,000 (1)

500,000–
1,000,000 (16)

50,000–
100,000 (12)

> 1,000,000 (5)

100,000–
250,000 (7)
250,000–
500,000 (8)
> 500,000 (27)

As subpoenas seeking confidential material increase, some
newsroom leaders are reporting that news sources are not as
willing to speak on condition of confidentiality. Nearly onethird of newsroom leaders in 2007 believed that sources were
either somewhat or significantly less willing to speak on condition of confidentiality with reporters at their organization than
they were five years earlier. By contrast, only 7.7% believe that
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sources are somewhat or significantly more willing to speak on
condition of confidentiality.269
Figure 18. Perceived Change in Willingness of Sources to
Speak on Condition of Confidentiality, Compared to Five
Years Ago

In comments to open-ended questions about the impact of
subpoenas on newsgathering, survey respondents indicated
that sources recently have verbalized their concerns about the
perceived decrease in protection for reporters. Respondents
suggested that “unless it is with a reporter who has been on a
beat for a long while and cultivated the source,” sources may no
longer speak on the basis of confidentiality. One respondent
from Rhode Island reported that sources have referred to that
state’s Taricani case270 when declining to provide confidential
information: “[Taricani] went to jail, and sources see that. More
and more, people are not willing to put themselves in that boat.
Sources say, ‘Even if you promise me, I will be found out. Even
if you promise us confidentiality, you’ll be forced to tell. Maybe
I shouldn’t talk.’” Newsroom leaders suggested this concern also impacts their assignment decisions: “We certainly recognize
the elevated risk,” noted one, “and it affects one’s willingness to
put reporters at risk.”
269. Sixty-two point five percent of newsroom leaders believe the willingness of sources is “about the same.”
270. See supra text accompanying notes 172–73.
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The survey asked two other questions designed to gauge
change related to confidential sources. First, it asked newsroom
leaders to assess the frequency of “use of confidential sources”
by their organizations, compared to five years ago. As demonstrated in Figure 19, the data indicate that in 35.4% of American newsrooms, the use of confidential sources has decreased in
the last five years. In 15.1% of newsrooms, the use is “significantly less.” Second, respondents were asked to specify changes
to newsroom “polic[ies] or practice[s] on the use of confidential
sources.” As demonstrated in Figure 20, almost one-third of organizations have altered their internal policies in the last five
years to permit fewer uses of such sources,271 while only 2.0% of
organizations permit more uses of such sources than five years
ago, and no organizations at all have a policy or practice that
permits “many more” uses of confidential sources than five
years ago.272

271. Newspapers report somewhat more changes in policy than broadcasters: 32.4% of newspapers permit either fewer or far fewer confidential sources
than five years ago; 26.5% of television stations permit either fewer or far fewer.
272. Both the reduction in the use of confidential sources and the changes
in policy on such sources are greater the larger the newspaper gets. As illustrated in Appendix, Figure A, smaller newspapers much more frequently report that their policies on confidential sources are “unchanged” in comparison
to five years ago (this is true of greater than half of the papers in the smallest
five circulation categories), while greater than half of the newspapers in the
largest two circulation categories have altered their policies to permit fewer or
far fewer confidential sources. Likewise, greater than 70% of editors of newspapers with circulations between 250,000 and 500,000 and circulations
500,000 or more report that their use of confidential sources is somewhat less
or significantly less compared with five years ago. But no similar patterns are
seen among television newsrooms. Indeed, as demonstrated by Appendix, Figure B, the smallest television newsrooms appear to be altering their policies to
permit fewer confidential sources in greater percentages than larger stations
are.
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Figure 19. Use of Confidential Sources Compared to Five
Years Ago

Figure 20. Changes to Newsroom Policies or Practices on the
Use of Confidential Sources, Compared to Five Years Ago

Some of the changes in policy were spurred, at least in
part, by changes in legal climate and the high-profile cases of
recent years.273 Notably, however, when a separate question
273. “News coverage of reporter’s privilege cases that were lost by reporters
at other organizations” was among the reasons for the change of policy at
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asked whether the “threat or use of subpoenas against your
news organization affected your policy on the use of confidential sources,” only twenty-nine newspapers and twenty broadcasters answered in the affirmative. Generalized to the wider
population, the data suggest that the threat or use of subpoenas affects the confidential-source policy at only an estimated
6.1% of news organizations in the country.
Indeed, when newsroom leaders at those organizations
that did change their policies in the last five years to permit
fewer uses of confidential sources were asked to provide the
reason or reasons for those changes, a majority cited reasons
that are tied more closely to journalism-industry norms than to
legal environment.274 Thirty-eight percent of organizations describe the change of policy or practice as being, to some extent,
motivated by a reason other than those listed in the survey;
this “other” option was selected more than any other answer
choice.275 Textual commentary suggests these reasons are
overwhelmingly rooted in changing industry norms about journalistic integrity and reputation with the media-consuming
public.276 More than 90% of the participants who volunteered
their own reasons for changing the policy referenced a desire
for greater transparency in reporting in order to increase credibility in the eyes of readers and viewers, with nearly all of
these going on to call it the “most important” of their listed reasons. Respondents reported that a change in policy on the use
of confidential sources “has much more to do with trust of the
media and its sources”277 than with any fear of or reaction to
subpoenas. Citing a new reader skepticism—both as to the accuracy of reports involving confidential sources and as to the
motives of those who decline to go on the record—respondents
referenced changes in newsroom leadership and corporate policy or the adoption of company-wide ethical codes designed to

30.2% of newsrooms making a change; 14.7% of organizations making a
change consider it the most significant reason for the change. See app. fig.C.
Advice of legal counsel was a factor motivating a change in policy for 27.8% of
newsrooms, and the receipt of at least one subpoena by the organization itself
was among the reasons for a change of policy for 13.9%. See id.
274. See id.
275. Id.
276. See Summary of Respondents’ Comments (on file with author and
available for public review at http://www.law.umn.edu/lawreview/issues.html
and http://www.law.byu.edu/Law_School/Faculty_Profile?241).
277. See id.
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meet these concerns:278 “It is a journalistic reason, not a legal
one.”279
D. SHIELD-LAW DATA
While Congress never has enacted a federal shield law, a
solid majority of state legislatures have passed shield laws that
create some form of a reporter’s privilege for subpoenas issued
in connection with proceedings in the given state.280 These statutes differ greatly with respect to coverage and degree of protection,281 but all provide at least a qualified privilege against
278. Managerial decisions were among the reasons for change for 36.5% of
newsrooms changing their policy or practice, and were the most significant
reason for 20.1%. See app. fig.C.
279. See Summary of Respondents’ Comments (on file with author and
available for public review at http://www.law.umn.edu/lawreview/issues.html
and http://www.law.byu.edu/Law_School/Faculty_Profile?241).
280. Maryland enacted the first state reporter shield-law statute in 1896.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (2006); see CITIZEN MEDIA LAW
PROJECT, STATE SHIELD LAWS, http://www.citmedialaw.org/state-shield-laws
(last visited Oct. 30, 2008). By the time of the survey, thirty-two states and the
District of Columbia had provided a reporter’s privilege legislatively. See ALA.
CODE § 12-21-142 (2006); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.300 to .390 (2006); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (2003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510 (2005); CAL. EVID.
CODE § 1070 (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-119 (2007); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 52-146t (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320–4326 (1999); D.C.
CODE §§ 16-4701–04 (2001); FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 249-30 (1995); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-901 (West 2003); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 3446-4-1 to -2 (LexisNexis 1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (LexisNexis
2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451–1459 (1999); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 767.5a, 767A.6 (West
2000); MINN. STAT. §§ 595.021–.025 (2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-902
(2007); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144–147 (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275 (2007);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7 (West
2003); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 853.11 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2739.04, 2739.12 (LexisNexis 2000); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2506 (Supp.
2007); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 44.510–40 (2007); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942
(West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-1 to -3 (1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11100 (Supp. 2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (LexisNexis 2000). Washington
State enacted the nation’s thirty-fourth shield law during the time of the
study. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.68.010 (West Supp. 2008). It was signed into
law on April 27, 2007, but it did not become effective until July 22, 2007. Because the law was not in effect at the time the Washington State respondents
participated in the study, Washington was counted as a non-shield-law state
for purposes of analysis.
281. For example, only ten states—Alabama, Arizona, Indiana, Kentucky,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, and Pennsylvania—and the District of Columbia, provide an absolute privilege for confidential sources, while
the others are qualified in some way. See Privilege Compendium Front Page,
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, http://rcfp.org/privilege/
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responding to some subpoenas and offer this privilege to at
least journalists from traditional news organizations like those
surveyed in the present study.282 In light of the intense debate
over the usefulness of a federal shield law, survey data were
analyzed to determine the effect, if any, of a state shield law on
subpoena frequency and handling.
It is clear that operating in a state with a shield law does
not immunize a newsroom from subpoenas. Shield-law states
and non-shield-law states had a nearly identical percentage of
organizations experiencing at least one subpoena in 2006.283
The percentage of organizations receiving at least one federal
subpoena in 2006 is nearly the same in states with and without
shield laws284 and so is the percentage of organizations receiving at least one state subpoena.285 Newsrooms in shield-law
states also report increases of time and resources spent responding to subpoenas compared to five years ago in nearly the
same amounts as non-shield-law states.286
Analysis does indicate that shield-law states have a smaller overall average number of subpoenas per media organization287 and smaller average numbers of both federal and state
subpoenas per media organization,288 but, as demonstrated in
Figure 21, the differences in subpoenas received—particularly
as to state subpoenas—are not as great as might be expected.289
(last visited Oct. 30, 2008).
282. Id.
283. The percentages are 48.8% and 48.6%, respectively.
284. Ten point five percent of organizations in shield-law states received
one or more federal subpoenas in 2006, while 9.9% of organizations in nonshield-law states did.
285. Fifty-nine point three percent of organizations in shield-law states received one or more state subpoenas in 2006, while 60.1% of organizations in
non-shield-law states did.
286. As demonstrated in Figure D, states without shield laws had only
slightly greater percentages of organizations reporting increases in time and
resources spent. See infra app. fig.D.
287. Among shield-law states, news organizations received an average of
3.40 subpoenas per organization in 2006. In non-shield-law states, they received an average of 4.13. This 21% difference would suggest that newsrooms
are subpoenaed more aggressively in states without shield laws.
288. Organizations in shield-law states received 0.35 federal subpoenas per
organization; organizations in non-shield-law states received 0.47. This may
suggest that state shield laws limit the number of federal subpoenas received.
Organizations in shield-law states received 2.38 state subpoenas per organization; organizations in non-shield-law states received 3.02.
289. But see 2001 REPORTERS COMMITTEE STUDY, supra note 199, at 11
(noting unexpected results in three different studies showing shield-law states
receiving a larger number of subpoenas per news outlet than non-shield-law
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Figure 21. Average Number of Subpoenas Received, by
Existence of Shield Law

Several potential explanations exist for the lack of a
stronger difference in shield-law and non-shield-law subpoena
data. One is that shield laws are ineffective or do not make a
meaningful difference in the ordinary operations of the media.
This explanation runs counter to the anecdotal reports of numerous respondents, who overwhelmingly described in survey
comments the quick withdrawal or limitation of subpoenas
when requesting attorneys were informed of the shield legislation. Another explanation may be that because many states
that do not have statutory shield laws nonetheless recognize a
state-based reporter’s privilege as a matter of common law or
constitutional doctrine,290 the ultimate legal protection may not
be significantly different between those states that have legislation and those that do not. An additional explanation, also
states, and in two of the three studies, the disparity was significant).
290. See, e.g., In re Contempt of Wright, 700 P.2d 40, 41 (Idaho 1985);
Winegard v. Oxberger, 258 N.W.2d 847, 850 (Iowa 1977); State v. Sandstrom,
581 P.2d 812, 814 (Kan. 1978); In re Letellier, 578 A.2d 722, 726–27 (Me.
1990); In re John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 574 N.E.2d 373, 375 (Mass.
1991); State ex rel. Classic III Inc. v. Ely, 954 S.W.2d 650, 655 (Mo. Ct. App.
1997); Opinion of the Justices, 373 A.2d 644, 647 (N.H. 1977) (applying the
constitutional provision); Hopewell v. Midcontinent Broadcast. Corp., 538
N.W.2d 780, 782 (S.D. 1995); State v. St. Peter, 315 A.2d 254, 256 (Vt. 1974);
Brown v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 429, 431 (Va. 1974); State ex rel. Hudok
v. Henry, 389 S.E.2d 188, 193 (W. Va. 1989); Zelenka v. State, 266 N.W.2d
279, 287 (Wis. 1978). After data collection concluded, the State of Utah
enacted a rule of evidence protecting news reporters. UT. R. EVID. 509.
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supported anecdotally by comments from newsroom leaders
participating in the survey, is that reporter’s privilege legislation does not greatly limit the number of subpoenas received,
but does impact the outcome of negotiations over those subpoenas. Some empirical data on subpoena handling appear to support this conclusion: Newsroom leaders in states with shield
laws reported that they complied with state subpoenas much
less often than those without shield laws and that they persuaded the issuing attorneys to withdraw state subpoenas more
often than did those without shield laws.291
Apart from the numerical analysis, survey data strongly
suggest that recent changes in legal climate are not perceived
any differently in states with shield laws than in states without. Perceptions of changes in courts’ attitudes, of the increase
in subpoena frequency, and of the willingness of prosecutors
and civil litigants to subpoena the press are virtually identical
among respondents with state shield laws and respondents
without. When asked to compare the organization’s risk of receiving a subpoena to the risk five years ago, organizations
with state shield laws and those without perceive no meaningful difference.292 The one notable difference in opinions about
legal climate between these two groups is that greater percentages of newsroom leaders in shield-law states believe that the
recent high-profile cases are a cause of the perceived increase
in subpoena frequency.293
Both of these findings—that legal climate change is perceived equally by those with and without state shield laws and
that those with state shield laws are more highly attuned to the
recent high-publicity cases—are perhaps unsurprising, given
the heavily federal nature of those recent cases. Because the
bulk of the dialogue on the question of media subpoenas has
been occurring at a federal level, it might be expected that
shield-law states, in which members of the press once felt relative ease, now have newsroom leaders who feel greater insecurity about the scope of their protection.
291. See infra fig.28.
292. See Impact and Perception, supra note 7, at 22.
293. Id. at 19. Weighted to account for nonresponses, 80.2% of responses
from shield-law states believe the increased frequency was a result of a
“change in climate brought about by the high-publicity cases in which reporters were forced to testify or jailed.” Sixty-four point four percent of responses
from non-shield-law states believe that this is a reason for the increased frequency. Id. at 19 n.159.
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These findings underscore one of the primary arguments
made in favor of a federal shield law—namely, the particularly
great need for uniformity in the area of legislative privileges.294
When a reporter engages in newsgathering and is faced with
the question of whether to promise confidentiality, she lacks
many pieces of knowledge about the down-the-road moment at
which a subpoena related to that newsgathering might arise.
Before speaking to the source, she does not know what information the source will provide; does not know whether—or to
whom—the gathered information will be useful; does not know
whether litigation will arise that is related to the information’s
usefulness; and, perhaps most critically, certainly does not
know whether that litigation would occur in a state or a federal
forum.295 Thus, at the critical moment in which the privilege
affects newsgathering, a reporter cannot know what legal standard might ultimately operate upon that moment. In the absence of a federal privilege, even a reporter operating under a
state shield law with an absolute privilege can make no guarantees to sources at the times in which those guarantees are
sought. This may explain, at least in part, why organizations
with state shield laws are reacting to the high-profile cases in
equal or greater numbers than organizations without them.
E. ADDITIONAL DATA: WHO IS ISSUING SUBPOENAS, WHAT ARE
THEY SEEKING, AND HOW DOES THE MEDIA RESPOND TO THEM?
The primary goal of the study was to provide useful data
on the frequency of media subpoenas, so as to inform the
longstanding numerical debate on the question. Mirroring the
2001 study, the current survey also gave respondents the option of providing greater details about the type of subpoenas received, what they sought, and how the organization responded
to them.
For almost 65% of the reported subpoenas, respondents
opted to report the type of proceeding in which the subpoena
arose. Among actual responses, reported in Figure 22, criminal
cases outnumbered civil by a wide margin, and the greatest
294. July 2005 Hearing, supra note 116 (testimony of Geoffrey Stone, Professor, University of Chicago School of Law) (“This generates uncertainty, and
uncertainty breeds silence.”); see also October 2005 Hearing, supra note 116
(testimony of Anne Gordon, Managing Editor, Philadelphia Inquirer).
295. July 2005 Hearing, supra note 116 (testimony of Matt Cooper, Reporter, Newsweek) (testifying that reporters lack the ability to foresee these factors).
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percentage of subpoenas was issued in conjunction with criminal trials. When weighted to account for nonresponses, as reported in Figure 23, these data indicate that in 2006, media organizations across the country received at least296 1980
subpoenas arising out of criminal trials, 560 arising out of criminal investigations, 312 arising out of grand juries, 1307 arising
out of civil trials, 236 arising out of civil depositions, and 33
arising out of administrative proceedings. There are no notable
differences in the kinds of proceedings in which subpoenas are
arising in the federal and state settings.
Figure 22. Specified Proceedings Giving Rise to Subpoenas
(Actual Responses)
Proceeding
Trial
Criminal

Investigation
Grand Jury
Deposition

Civil
Trial
Administrative Proceeding
Don't Know
Other
Unspecified
Total

Forum
Federal
State
124
728
77.5%
68.3%
1066
160
27
212
16.9%
19.9%
47.8%
48.5%
9
126
5.6%
11.8%
19
83
24.7%
14.2%
77
585
58
502
23.0%
26.6%
75.3%
85.8%
2
12
0.6%
0.5%
0
4
0.0%
0.2%
8
58
2.4%
2.6%
88
473
26.3%
21.5%
335
2198
100.0%
100.0%

Total

1226
48.4%

662
26.1%

852
69.5%
239
19.5%
135
11.0%
102
15.4%
560
84.6%

14
0.6%
4
0.2%
66
2.6%
561
22.1%
2533
100.0%

296. Because the type of proceeding was not specified for almost onequarter of the reported subpoenas, and another 2.5% of responses specified
“Other” or “Don’t Know,” this extrapolation indicates that another 1498 subpoenas were issued in 2006 for which the type of proceeding cannot be determined.
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Figure 23. Overall Proceedings Giving Rise to Subpoenas
(Weighted Responses)
Proceeding
Trial
Criminal

Investigation
Grand Jury
Deposition

Civil
Trial
Administrative Proceeding
Don't Know
Other
Unspecified
Total

Forum
Federal
State
284
1696
78.0%
68.2%
62
498
364
2488
47.0%
48.3%
17.0%
20.0%
18
294
4.9%
11.8%
42
194
172
24.4%
1371
14.2%
22.2%
26.6%
130
1177
75.6%
85.8%
5
28
0.6%
0.5%
0
11
0.0%
0.2%
17
118
2.2%
2.3%
216
1136
27.9%
22.0%
774
5152
100.0%
100.0%

Total

2852
48.1%

1543
26.0%

1980
69.4%
560
19.6%
312
10.9%
236
15.3%
1307
84.7%

33
0.6%
11
0.2%
135
2.3%
1352
22.8%
5926
100.0%

Respondents also were asked to specify the source of their
subpoenas in the criminal and civil settings. Responses are
summarized in Figure 24. By a small margin, more of the criminal-proceeding subpoenas were specified as having been issued
by prosecutors than by defense attorneys. In the civil setting,
where the strong majority of subpoenas appear to have been issued in cases in which the news organization was not itself a
party to the suit,297 respondents reported a larger number of
subpoenas issued by plaintiffs’ attorneys than by defense attorneys.298 Given the relatively large number of unspecified responses, it is difficult to identify accurately any trends over time
297. Only fifty-eight subpoenas were specified as arising in cases in which
the news organization “was a party to the suit (such as a libel suit).” However,
respondents reported 768 subpoenas arising out of civil suits in which the
news organization “was not a party to the suit (brought in as a ‘third party’).”
This latter number is more than the total 662 civil subpoenas reported, making it somewhat difficult to draw further conclusions from the data.
298. Respondents reported 340 subpoenas issued by plaintiffs in thirdparty civil proceedings and 194 issued by defendants in such proceedings. One
hundred forty-one answered the question “Don’t Know.” The total number of
subpoenas reported in these answers was 675—again, slightly exceeding the
662 civil subpoenas that were reported in the question asking respondents to
identify the kind of proceedings involved. Assuming the accuracy of these reported numbers, the weighted numbers for the entire population indicate that,
in 2006, media organizations received 761 subpoenas from plaintiffs’ attorneys
in third-party civil actions and 447 from defense attorneys in such suits.
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in the entities issuing subpoenas, but it may be notable that, in
the 2001 survey, subpoenas from defense attorneys in criminal
cases outnumbered those from prosecutors, while in the present
survey, the reverse was true.
Figure 24. Entities Issuing Media Subpoenas
Criminal Setting
Source of
Subpoenas
Prosecution
Defense
Police
Special
Prosecutor
Don’t Know
Total

Federal
Subpoenas
78
60
1

State
Subpoenas

Total

2001
Subpoenas

497
413
39

575
473
40

206
223
22

3

0

3

N/A

11

100

111

33

153

1049

1202

484

Civil Suits in Which Media Was Not a Party
Source of
Subpoenas
Plaintiff
Defendant
Don’t Know
Total

Federal
Subpoenas
36
29
22
87

State
Subpoenas

Total

2001
Subpoenas

304
165
119
588

340
194
141
675

91
79
125
295

Figure 25 specifies the items sought in federal and state
subpoenas to newspapers in 2006. Column A lists the actual
responses from survey participants. Column B lists the
weighted numbers that suggest the overall number of instances
in which each type of item was sought from a newspaper in
2006. Column C lists the 2001 responses. Published stories are
the most frequently subpoenaed items reported in 2006, followed by notes and testimony at trial. Testimony at a deposition, unpublished photographs, and published photographs are
the next most sought-after items. Figure 26 specifies the items
sought in federal and state subpoenas to television broadcasters in 2006. Column A lists the actual responses from survey
participants. Column B lists the weighted numbers that suggest the overall number of instances in which each type of item
was sought from a broadcaster in 2006. Column C lists the
2001 responses. By an overwhelming margin, material actually
broadcast was the most-requested item in subpoenas to broadcasters in 2006. Unedited audio/videotape is the next most
sought after, with outtakes, notes, and testimony at trial ranking next. The data demonstrating that already-published and
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already-broadcast material are the most-sought items are in
keeping with the strong weight of anecdotal evidence and also
serve as an explanation for the relatively high rate of compliance with media subpoenas.
Figure 25. Items Sought from Newspapers
Item Sought

Column A

Column B

Survey Responses

Weighted Responses

Column C
2001
Responses

Federal
6

State
40

Total
46

Federal
12

State
86

Total
98

6

25

31

12

52

64

16

32

180

212

63

394

457

70

Photo Negatives

1

29

30

2

67

69

37

Published
Photographs

4

72

76

8

167

176

47

Published
Stories

26

210

236

51

462

513

74

Testimony at a
Deposition

18

80

98

35

174

208

47

Testimony at
Trial

23

125

148

48

287

334

67

Unpublished
Photographs

3

80

83

6

187

193

47

Audiotapes
Internal Memos
Notes

Written Drafts
Total

30

5

29

34

10

61

71

14

124

870

994

245

1938

2183

449

Figure 26. Items Sought from Broadcasters
Item Sought
Internal Memos
Materially
Actually
Broadcast
(Audio/Video)
Notes

Column C

Column A

Column B

Survey Responses

Weighted Responses

Federal
0

State
45

Total
45

Federal
0

State
117

Total
117

108

980

1088

248

2294

2543

2001
Responses
17
541

21

146

167

44

340

384

59

Outtakes

20

176

196

45

427

473

121

Testimony at a
Deposition

23

38

61

61

95

156

5

Testimony at
Trial

24

111

135

63

282

344

43

Unedited
Audio/Videotape

93

595

688

210

1419

1629

172

1

80

81

3

196

198

41

290

2171

2461

674

5171

5845

999

Written Drafts
Total
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Respondents were given the option of reporting how they
handled the subpoenas they received. Of the subpoenas for
which the media organization’s method of addressing the subpoena was specified, 60.1% were complied with fully, without
any opposition by the news organization. This represents a
slight decrease from the 68% of subpoenas for which the Reporters Committee reported full compliance in 2001.299 In
22.2% of reported instances, respondents persuaded the individual issuing the subpoena to withdraw it. The Reporters
Committee indicated that this occurred in 19% of the reported
subpoenas in 2001.300 In 17.7% of reported instances, respondents in the current study reported filing a motion to quash a
subpoena. A court granted a motion to quash in 81.9% of the total filings; in 18.1%, the court denied it.301 In the 2001 study,
news organizations challenged 8% of the subpoenas with a motion to quash, and were successful in 75% of those motions.302
Overall, it appears that the string of recent high-profile cases
has not meaningfully altered the way in which media organizations respond to subpoenas that they receive—apart from the
fact that perhaps compliance is slightly down and the number
of motions to quash is slightly up. If indeed the legal climate is
changing, it seems it thus far has changed only the frequency
with which certain subpoenas are issued, and not the handling
of subpoenas once they are received.
Figure 27. Handling of Subpoenas
Handling of Subpoenas

Survey Total

Complied Fully

60.1%

Persuaded Withdrawal

22.2%
17.7%

Filed Motion to Quash

Granted
Denied

81.9%
18.1%

299. 2001 REPORTERS COMMITTEE STUDY, supra note 199, at 10.
300. Id.
301. One of the respondents whose motion to quash was denied reported
that it was appealed to a higher court with an ultimate favorable ruling. One
other respondent reported an appeal with an ultimate unfavorable ruling.
302. 2001 REPORTERS COMMITTEE STUDY, supra note 199, at 10.
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Subpoena-response data were cross-analyzed with shieldlaw data in an effort to determine the impact of legislative protection on subpoena handling. Results are summarized in Figure 28. Overall compliance rates for subpoenas issued in states
without shield laws are considerably greater than for those issued in states with shield laws. In 2006, responding news organizations in states without shield laws “complied fully, without opposing” with 72.1% of all subpoenas issued. News
organizations in states with shield laws complied with 53.9% of
subpoenas. Notably, when only federal subpoenas are considered, the disparity disappears: both organizations in states
with shield laws and organizations in states without them
comply with about half of their federal subpoenas. Conversely,
organizations unprotected by a state shield law comply with
state subpoenas 73.9% of the time, while their counterparts in
shield-law states comply 54.4% of the time. News organizations
in states with shield laws also were more likely than those
without them to have persuaded the issuing attorney to withdraw the subpoena. Overall, organizations in states with shield
laws file motions to quash more often than do their peers in
states without shield laws; but shield-law state organizations
file fewer motions to quash federal subpoenas than non-shieldlaw state organizations file. Somewhat surprisingly, among
those reporting their subpoena handling, motions to quash
were more successful in states without shield laws than in
states with them.303 Even more surprisingly, this disparity in
success rates holds true even with respect to state proceedings.
Although the question warrants further examination, this
could provide evidence that court-created privileges are more
protective of reporters than are legislative ones.
Finally, the data about how organizations responded to
subpoenas also were cross-analyzed by medium. Results are
summarized in Figure 29. Overall, broadcasters are significantly more likely to comply fully with a subpoena than are newspapers. The data suggest that in 2006 they did so 70.7% of the
time—three times as frequently as did newspapers, which complied fully with only 23.3% of subpoenas they received. Although both kinds of media organizations are less likely to
comply fully with federal subpoenas than with state subpoenas,
the compliance rate for broadcasters was drastically greater in
303. Organizations in states with shield laws reported success in 80% of all
motions to quash. Organizations in states without shield laws reported a
87.2% success rate.
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both federal and state forums. Newspapers also persuade the
issuing attorney to withdraw the subpoena almost three times
as often as broadcasters do. Newspapers seek motions to quash
more than twice as often as broadcasters do, but their motions
are less successful than broadcasters’ motions.
Figure 28. Handling of Subpoenas by States With and Without
Shield Laws
Handling
of
Subpoena
Complied
Fully
Persuaded
Withdrawal
Filed
Motion to
Quash

Handling
of
Subpoena
Complied
Fully
Persuaded
Withdrawal
Filed
Motion to
Quash

Handling
of
Subpoena
Complied
Fully
Persuaded
Withdrawal
Filed
Motion to
Quash

All Subpoenas
No Shield Law

Shield Law

72.1%

53.9%

14.8%

25.7%

13.0%

20.3%

Granted
Denied

87.2%
12.8%

Granted
Denied

80.0%
20.0%

Federal Subpoenas
No Shield Law

Shield Law

50.0%

51.0%

14.0%

19.1%

36.0%

29.9%

Granted
Denied

88.9%
11.1%

Granted
Denied

78.7%
21.3%

State Subpoenas
No Shield Law

Shield Law

73.9%

54.4%

14.9%

26.8%

11.1%

18.8%

Granted
Denied

86.8%
13.2%

Granted
Denied

80.3%
19.7%
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Figure 29. Handling of Subpoenas by Medium
Handling
of
Subpoena
Complied
Fully
Persuaded
Withdrawal
Filed
Motion to
Quash

Handling
of
Subpoena
Complied
Fully
Persuaded
Withdrawal
Filed
Motion to
Quash

Handling
of
Subpoena
Complied
Fully
Persuaded
Withdrawal
Filed
Motion to
Quash

All Subpoenas
Newspapers

Broadcasters

23.3%

70.7%

44.7%

15.7%

31.9%

13.6%

Granted
Denied

71.5%
28.5%

Granted
Denied

89.0%
11.0%

Federal Subpoenas
Newspapers

Broadcasters

14.3%

57.0%

34.7%

17.7%

51.0%

25.3%

Granted
Denied

68.0%
32.0%

Granted
Denied

90.0%
10.0%

State Subpoenas
Newspapers

Broadcasters

24.6%

72.5%

46.1%

15.4%

29.3%

12.1%

Granted
Denied

72.4%
27.6%

Granted
Denied

88.7%
11.3%

Anecdotal survey comments suggest that these data may
not tell the full story of compliance and negotiation by television news outlets. In the interest of facilitating comparison
with the 2001 study, the language of the Reporters Committee
answer choices was adopted verbatim in the present study. Accordingly, respondents who did not file a motion to quash had
the option of specifying either that they “complied fully, without opposing” or that they “persuaded [the] individual issuing
[the] subpoena to withdraw it after discussion with attorney/editor/other.” Almost three dozen broadcaster participants
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noted in the “other comments” section of the survey that they
had chosen the “complied fully” option because it most closely
resembled their handling of a given subpoena, but that it was
not a perfect match. All of these respondents described a newsroom policy of fully complying with requests for alreadybroadcasted tape and, even when the subpoena seeks more
than already-broadcasted material, notifying the subpoenaing
attorney that the station will willingly provide material that
had appeared on air (often for a dubbing fee, which sometimes
itself acts as a deterrent).304 These organizations uniformly indicated that subpoena requests often do seek much more than
the already-broadcasted material, and that their policies are to
not comply with that aspect of the request.305 One news director described what seems to be the common occurrence at television news outlets: “We often get subpoenas seeking every bit
of footage we shot on a particular incident, like a car accident.
304. “I alert the attorney that there will be a $350 dub fee to produce a
copy of the video and they usually tell me the video will not be needed,” one
news director reported. Broadcast respondents described fees as low as $30
and as high as $250 per hour for research and $350 per hour for dubbing.
Some newspapers likewise report instituting research fees as a way of recouping the cost of lost time and discouraging sweeping subpoenas. “We sell accident photos to lawyers with the promise that we won’t be called to testify,” one
commented. “We now charge $100 per hour for research when we aren’t a party in the case,” another editor reported. “The minimum charge is $100 and
$100 for each hour or part of an hour thereafter. Four of [our reported] subpoenas were withdrawn after we explained our charges to the lawyers who issued the subpoenas.” “One way to discourage this is to charge for material,”
another commented.
305. The participants’ comments reflect the organizations’ unwillingness to
comply with these kinds of requests:
“We do have a policy of not giving out dubs of routine news video beyond
that which actually aired. This is to avoid setting a precedent that could be
used in the event our raw tape was subpoenaed.”
“We have had overall luck ‘training’ our local police, prosecutors, and defense attorneys to include the following phrase in their subpoenas: ‘video that
aired on (specific date and/or newscast)’. It allows us to expedite their request
because we are not turning over unpublished material or raw tape.”
“We only provide what has aired.”
“We never give outtakes.”
“We ‘comply fully’ in the sense that we give already broadcasted material.
But we never turn over more than that.”
“Many come in asking for much more, hoping to get some nugget that
wasn’t aired, but we don’t provide that.”
“We have educated many of the lawyers around here to ask for what was
broadcast and not for ‘all material.’ If they draft a broad subpoena, they know
we’ll fight it.”
“Attorneys now know not to ask for unedited footage, because we’ll give
them what has aired without any challenge.”
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But then I will call the attorney and try to figure out what they
really want so that we can just focus on that and not have to
spend our time digging up everything. They usually will just
take as much as they can get without a fuss, and when we offer
the aired footage, they ordinarily don’t push for more.”
CONCLUSION
In the ongoing debate over a federal shield law, both opponents and proponents of the legislation are offering what may
well be truthful assessments of media-subpoena numbers in the
United States. However, these estimates do not advance the
debate because they are either too narrow or too anecdotal to be
helpful. The present study’s data on the frequency and nature
of subpoenas received by the press flesh out the empirical side
of the debate and provide a more useful starting point for the
policy dialogue: Subpoenas to the media are issued with some
regularity; they are not limited to the media organizations or
the substantive issues involved in the highest-profile recent
cases; and, at least in some categories, they appear to be on the
increase.
The current study only begins to expose the depth and the
breadth of media subpoenas. The studied population—daily
newspapers and major-network-affiliated television news operations—comprises only one portion of the vast set of organizations in the country with employees who would be covered by
even a narrow legislative definition of journalist. The studied
population excludes, among others, all radio journalists; the
wide array of cable television news operations; reporters at
newspapers with anything less than a daily circulation; journalists at all magazines, journals, and newsletters; and the ever-increasing number of journalists who make a living publishing exclusively online. If, as the statistically extrapolated data
suggest, the limited population of news organizations studied
here received more than 7000 state and federal subpoenas in a
single calendar year—and if, as common sense and reporter experience suggest, the determination of whether a future subpoena will arise in a federal or a state forum is nearly impossible to make in the course of ordinary reporting—a federal law
addressing subpoenas would be relevant to a large amount of
newsgathering by a large number of reporters each year.
More specifically, survey data on federal subpoenas and on
subpoenas seeking material obtained under a promise of confidentiality clearly indicate that a federal statute—even one ap-
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plying only to confidential material, like the bill that most recently cleared the Senate Judiciary Committee—would have
more than isolated applicability. Likewise, because the data indicate that the nature, source, and substance of federal subpoenas are diverse, even a shield law with a strong nationalsecurity exception would be germane and useful to journalists
in newsrooms that are widely varied in geography and organizational size.
Overall, the data do not reveal an “avalanche” of subpoenas, and it may well be that journalists are alarmed about subpoenas to a greater degree than is warranted by the actual numerical increases.306 But this apprehension might be expected,
given the simultaneous signals that court-based privileges may
be on the decline. Even an incrementally larger number of subpoenas results in a larger number of opportunities for courts to
continue to unravel a judicially created privilege. And with
each high-profile case that rejects the privilege, the tone of the
legislative debate turns ever more desperate for media organizations fearing that courts will retreat entirely from recognizing a privilege for journalists.
Ultimately, of course, there are many more arguments to
be made for and against the creation of a federal legislative
privilege for members of the press. Certainly, policy preferences
should be aired, societal implications should be weighed, and
the merits and drawbacks of enacting a federal shield for reporters should be debated in full. However, with this Article’s
new empirical evidence now available, lawmakers and interested parties should be able to turn their attention more fully to
the substantive contours of legislative proposals, ending the
“numbers game”307 that has occupied too much of the debate to
date.

306. See Impact and Perception, supra note 7, at 18.
307. 2007 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 150, at 88 (statement of
Rep. Pence, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
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Figure A. Change in Policy on Use of Confidential Sources
Compared to Five Years Ago, by Newspaper Circulation

Figure B. Change in Policy on Use of Confidential Sources
Compared to Five Years Ago, by Broadcast Market Size
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Figure C. Reasons for Changing Newsroom Policy on
Confidential Sources
Percent of Newsrooms
Listing as Among the
Reasons for Change in
Policy

Percent of Newsrooms
Listing as Most
Significant Reason for
Change of Policy

A Request from
Management

36.5%

20.1%

A Request from
Reporters

9.9%

4.8%

The Receipt of One or
More Subpoenas by the
Organization

13.9%

5.3%

News Coverage of
Reporters' Privilege
Cases that Were Lost
by Reporters at Other
Organizations

30.2%

14.7%

Changes in the
Attitudes of Major
Sources

18.5%

6.2%

Advice of Legal Counsel

27.8%

17.1%

Other

38.0%

31.8%

Reasons for Change
of Policy

Figure D. Time and Resources Expended on Subpoenas
Compared to Five Years Ago, by Existence of Shield Law

